La Libye et la France s’accordent sur un partenariat stratégique
La Libye et la France ont signé le 21 octobre un document prévoyant l’instauration d’un partenariat stratégique entre les deux pays. Ce partenariat devrait concerner les domaines de l’économie et de l’énergie. Le document a été signé lors du déplacement du ministre français de l’Industrie, Christian Estrosi à Tripoli.
L’accord signé par le ministre français de l’Industrie avec les officiels libyens n’est qu’un préalable. Il ne fait en effet que prévoir l’ouverture de négociations entre les deuxpays pour parvenir à un accord sur la construction d’une centrale nucléaire.
Déjà en 2007, à l’occasion de la visite de Mouamar Kadhafi à Paris, un accord de coopération dans le nucléaire civil avait été signé. Et l’an dernier, Areva avait cherché à vendre aux Libyens une centrale nucléaire destinée à produire de l’électricité et à dessaler l’eau de mer. Sans aucun résultat. D’autant moins de résultats que dans l’intervalle la Libye a signé d’autres accords du même genre avec l’Ukraine, la Russie et le Canada.
L’ accord de partenariat qui vient d’être signé entre Paris et Tripoli concerne aussi le secteur pétrolier. La Libye dispose d’énormes réserves inexploitées et les compagnies pétrolières du monde entier sont aux aguets. Ce sont d’ailleurs ces exportations pétrolières qui expliquent le déséquilibre des échanges avec la France qui en 2009 a exporté vers la Libye des produits pour 700 millions d’euros et en a importé pour 2 milliards.
Une balance commerciale qui sera peut-être rééquilibrée par la commande de 15 appareils Airbus et d’un paquebot de 565 millions d’euros aux chantiers de Saint-Nazaire.
RFI.
giovedì 28 ottobre 2010
Non siamo più soli in Libia
Ingolfati di armi
LA FRANCIA VUOLE ARMARE EMIRATI E KUWAIT
Sarkozy prova ad inserirsi nella corsa al riarmo delle monarchie del Golfo, in vista di un possibile conflitto tra Israele e Iran. Offre decine di jet da combattimento Rafale. Ma non sarà facile fare concorrenza agli Usa forti del recente accordo da 60 miliardi di dollari per forniture militari all’Arabia saudita.
Roma, 26 ottobre 2010, Nena News – Fa gola alla Francia il grande affare del riarmo delle monarchie del Golfo in vista di un possibile conflitto tra Israele e Iran che finirebbe, inevitabilmente, per coinvolgere (e devastare) l’intero Vicino Oriente. Di fronte al contratto da 60 miliardi di dollari che vedrà nei prossimi anni gli Stati Uniti fornire armi di ogni genere all’Arabia saudita (con il pieno consenso di Israele), il presidente francese Nicolas Sarkozy è impegnato a convincere gli Emirati arabi uniti e il Kuwait ad acquistare rispettivamente 60 e 28 caccia Rafale (Dassault).
L’agenzia di stampa americana UPI, riferendo la notizia, sottolinea che non sarà un compito facile quello che si è dato Sarkozy. Sebbene gli Emirati abbiano più volte acquistato in passato aerei da combattimento francesi, stavolta non appaiono convinti di fronte alla mancata vendita all’estero di un solo Rafale da parte della Dassault. Temono che il velivolo sia poco competitivo.
Da parte sua il Kuwait, che ha sempre acquistato armi americane, è alla ricerca di aerei dell’ultima generazione. I contatti tra Parigi e Kuwait city sono in corso dal 2008 e riguardano un accordo da 4,4 miliardi di dollari. Ma l’emirato ora ha preso in considerazione anche le proposte della svedese Saab che offre il suo Gripen e dell’americana Boeing che propone lo F/A-18 Super Hornet. Diversi parlamentari kuwaitiani sostengono che il Rafale sia inferiore agli altri due jet e che dietro l’interesse per la proposta francese ci sarebbero gli interessi personali di alcuni esponenti del governo.
Il Financial Times sottolinea che Sarkozy ha la tendenza ad annunciare accordi per forniture militari che in realtà non ancora stati definiti e firmati. Nel 2009, ricorda il quotidiano economico, comunicò un accordo ufficiale per la vendita di 36 Rafale alle forze aeree brasiliane. A distanza di un anno, i brasiliani sembrano molto più interessati allo svedese Gripen. Lo stesso è accaduto qualche settimana fa quando il presidente francese ha annunciato la vendita del Rafale agli Emirati – desiderosi di sostituire 63 vecchi Mirage, sempre della Dassault – ma dal Golfo lasciano intendere di avere più interesse per lo F/A-18 Super Hornet.
Abu Dhabi, responsabile per la difesa degli Emirati, ha reso le cose ancora più complicate per Sarkozy chiedendo a Parigi che il Rafale venga armato con i missili di fabbricazione Usa Slam Er/2 al posto degli europei Mbda Am-39. Gli Emirati vogliono un missile in grado di colpire in Iran. Lo Slam infatti ha un raggio di 160 miglia mentre l’Am-39 (una versione aggiornata del francese Exocet) non supera le 65 miglia.
L’industria militare Dassault non regge il confront tecnologico con le produzioni belliche di altri paesi. Ha ottenuto una commessa per 294 Rafale dalle forze armate francesi ma senza contratti all’estero potrebbe non avere le risorse per soddisfare l’acquisto dei jet fatto dall’aviazione nazionale. Il ministero della difesa francese ha ordinato altri 11 Rafale per il 2011al solo scopo di tenere in vita la Dassault facendo spendere al contribuente francese altri 1,1 miliardi di dollari mentre il paese fa i conti con la crisi economica.
La Francia ha perduto, a vantaggio della Russia, il terzo posto tra i paesi esportatori di armi (i primi due sono Usa e Gran Bretagna). Washington e Mosca, spiega l’agenzia UPI, sono avvantaggiate anche dall’offerta multipla degli europei che propongono ai potenziali acquirenti tre tipi di aerei da combattimento dalle caratteristiche simili. Nena News
Il vero problema in Yemen
YEMEN: CARENZA ACQUA E TERRA, CAUSA PRIMARIA DI INSTABILITA’
E' la scarsità delle risorse primarie a provocare tensioni e conflitti sociali nel paese e a mietere più vittime dell’instabilità politica e dei movimenti indipendentisti. Lo rivela un nuovo rapporto diffuso dall’agenzia delle Nazioni Unite.
Roma, 27 ottobre 2010 – Nena News (foto di Adel Yahya – IRIN) – Le violenze scaturite dalla povertà di risorse, in primis terra agricola e acqua, mieterebbero in Yemen più vittime delle faide ribelli, degli attacchi terroristici e del movimento indipendentista che si oppone alle autorità governative. E’ quanto denuncia un report diffuso ieri dall’agenzia delle Nazioni Unite IRIN, dal titolo “Sotto pressione: conflitto sociale per la terra e l’acqua in Yemen”.
Mentre il sud è pervaso dal movimento indipendentista, con i militanti affiliati ad Al Qaeda nascosti soprattutto nella zona montagnosa meridionale, il nord invece dagli attacchi delle fazioni ribelli contro il governo, un conflitto sociale di altrettanto ampia portata caratterizza l’odierno Yemen, nonostante tale conflitto non attragga a sufficienza l’attenzione né dei media né delle potenze occidentali: un conflitto che nasce dalla povertà e dalla scarsità delle risorse di base.
Secondo i dati riportati nel documento, le violenze suscitate dalla lotta intestina per la terra e l’acqua, soprattutto nelle aree più povere, quelli rurali, avrebbero provocato la morte di almeno 4000 persone all’anno, dati confermati dal Ministro dell’Interno yemenita e che non includono la percentuale, significativa, dei casi sottoposti e trattati dalla legge tribale.
I conflitti sociali scaturiscono principalmente dalla mancanza di un sistema affidabile di registrazione delle proprietà terriere, cosa che provoca dispute che si protraggono nel corso di decenni. Quando la mediazione tra i gruppi tribali non sortisce alcun effetto, la violenza rimane l’unica opzione.
Risorse idriche:
La scarsità delle risorse idriche è attualmente l’elemento di crisi più preoccupante che la popolazione yemenita è costretta a fronteggiare. La disponibilità annua di acqua a persona è pari a circa il 2% della media mondiale e ci si aspetta che la capitale, Sana’a, diventi presto la prima capitale al mondo a rimanere all’asciutto. Ma le radici dell’attuale crisi dell’acqua, risalgono agli anni settanta, secondo Gerhard Lichtenthaeler, un consulente della Cooperazione tedesca (German Technical Corporation) che lavora sul campo in merito alla risoluzione della scarsità delle risorse idriche. Allora le dispute sull’acqua erano principalmente relative alle risorse in superficie, ma con l’arrivo delle nuove tecnologie importate dall’Arabia Saudita, molti yemeniti furono in grado di scavare pozzi propri e risolvere il problema temporaneamente. A distanza di 30 anni, il problema si ripresenta dato che le risorse sotterranee sono quasi del tutto esaurite. Inoltre costruire oggi un pozzo, su un pezzo di terra oggetto di dispute tribali, è fonte ulteriore di violenze e tensioni.
Possesso di armi:
Il perdurante conflitto sociale in Yemen è esacerbato dal crescente possesso di armi. Secondo le statistiche, ci sarebbero 60 milioni di armi, statistiche che però sarebbero state più volte ridimensionate; secondo il report ONU, su un paese di 23 milioni di abitanti, vi sarebbero circa 11 milioni di armi, una percentuale che è comunque una tra le più alte in tutto il mondo.
Il governo yemenita ha intrapreso diverse campagne e azioni, a partire dal 2007, per ridurre la presenza di armi soprattutto nelle zone urbane. Più difficile è il controllo sulle aree rurali, luoghi dove vige ancora la legge tribale.
In un paese dove l’amministrazione USA investe milioni di dollari per risolvere le minacce alla sicurezza del governo yemenita, gli analisti denunciano invece che il conflitto sociale è la più grande e preoccupante sfida che andrebbe accolta se si vogliono risolvere a lungo termine i problemi di instabilità politica dello Yemen. Nena News
La Russia torna in Afghanistan
"La Russie a donné son accord pour revenir combattre en Afghanistan, à la demande des Occidentaux, qui avaient aidé les moudjahidin à repousser ses forces hors du pays il y a vingt et un ans", annonce ce 27 octobre le quotidien britannique. Il révèle "avoir appris que Moscou avait entrepris de former des militaires afghans et des troupes de lutte antidrogue, et avait accepté, sur le principe, de fournir à l'OTAN des hélicoptères qui seraient utilisés en Afghanistan. Un certain nombre d'avions ont déjà été vendus à la Pologne, membre de la coalition, pour intervenir dans le conflit." Selon le journal, cette nouvelle implication russe pourrait être officialisée lors du prochain sommet de l'OTAN, prévu à Lisbonne les 19 et 20 novembre. Dmitri Medvedev a été invité à y participer.
La vera storia di Re Hassan Secondo
Lo spietato Hassan II, in 500 pagine
Marocco, ottobre 2010 - Sta per uscire un libro dell'avvocato francese Maurice Butin, che parla della crudeltà di Hassan II e degli anni di piombo in Marocco, fino all'affaire Ben Barka
(Hassan II)
L’Expression – 24 ottobre 2010
Lo spietato Hassan II, in 500 pagine
di Nabil Belbey
Sta per essere pubblicato il libro di un avvocato francese. Esso racconta nei minimi dettagli l’astio del re HassanII nei confronti di tutti quelli che osavano opporsi
Per descrivere i drammi delle famiglie marocchine, vissuti durante gli anni di piombo del regno di Hassan II, un libro scritto dall’avvocato Maurice Butin sta per essere pubblicato in Francia per i tipi delle edizioni Karthala col titolo: “Hassan II, De Gaulle, Ben Barka: quello che so di loro”. L’opera danneggerà certamente l’immagine del regno marocchino, che persiste nelle medesime pratiche ai danni del popolo saharawi.
Questo libro di 500 pagine racconta che “i desaparecidos venivano presi nella più grande discrezione attraverso veri e propri agguati, organizzati nella pubblica via o qualche volta a casa loro alle prime ore del mattino, da parte di uomini incappucciati”. Si trattava – scrive l’autore - generalmente di eliminare per un certo periodo degli oppositori diventati troppo fastidiosi per il regime, oppure solo di far sparire delle “brave persone”, in modo da “intimidire un intero quartiere”.
Talvolta sopraggiungeva la morte nel corso della tortura, praticata per tentare di ottenere da questi “desaparecidos delle informazioni su questo o quell’avvenimento. Informazioni che a volte essi non avevano affatto”. L’autore fornisce così una testimonianza su una parte almeno di un periodo doloroso per molti militanti marocchini, nel primo decennio dopo l’indipendenza, che egli ha conosciuto direttamente in qualità di avvocato nei processi politici dell’epoca, talvolta solo avvocato francese insieme a colleghi marocchini.
Nella prima parte, egli descrive la resistenza del popolo marocchino al protettorato. La seconda parte copre gli anni 1956-1965, descrive fin dai primi mesi dell’indipendenza la crescita di potere del principe Moulay Hassan, il futuro re Hassan, la sua volontà e la sua fretta di regnare come padrone assoluto sul popolo marocchino. E anche il suo astio nei confronti di tutti coloro che potevano opporsi a lui e soprattutto nei confronti di quei rari uomini come Mehdi Ben Barka, il solo forse nel paese a poter competere con lui.
La terza parte del libro riguarda lo sviluppo dell’affaire Ben Barka, la sua sparizione, e le conseguenze immediate, in Marocco e in Francia. L’autore ricorda la prima denuncia per sequestro di persona, seguita da due processi innanzi la Corte d’Assise della Senna. Poi la seconda denuncia, nell’ottobre 1975, in relazione alla quale è ancora in corso una istruttoria a Parigi, questa volta per “omicidio”, merito della lotta portata avanti per più di 40 anni dalla famiglia Ben Barka, per tentare di scoprire tutta la verità su questa tragedia.
Infatti il venerdì 29 ottobre 1965, a Parigi, il leader dell’opposizione marocchina fu sequestrato e ucciso. In Marocco una sola persona ne era informata: il re Hassan II. Venne informato del sequestro di uno dei suoi peggiori nemici da un amico, a sua volta informato da un deputato francese, ma il sovrano lascerà credere di avere appreso la notizia dalla stampa.
In Marocco siamo nel pieno degli anni di piombo e viene così meno il contrasto tra il principe Moulay Hassan, diventato il re Hassan II nel 1961, e il leader dell’opposizione che in più è anche il segretario generale della Tricontinentale per le missioni mondiali.
Il libro ricorda la situazione interna del Marocco prima del 1956, descrive poi gli avvenimenti che sono seguiti all’indipendenza fino alla sparizione di Mehdi Ben Barka. Parla della lotta portata avanti da Ben Barka e sottolinea che l’ostilità del re Hassan II nei confronti di questa alta personalità politica risale all’inizio dell’indipendenza, quando il sovrano era ancora il principe Moulay Hassan.
Attraverso al vicenda Ben Barka, il libro svela l’azione determinante degli agenti marocchini agli ordini del re. Rivela anche il ruolo giocato da poliziotti e uomini dei servizi segreti, anche alte personalità francesi. Sia coscientemente che per negligenza.
“Ciò che è accaduto sul versante francese è stato solo qualcosa di volgare e subalterno”, ha dichiarato il generale De Gaulle, citato dall’autore. Quarantacinque anni sono passati e la sparizione di Ben Barka resta un mistero. Da chi è stato ucciso? Come? Dove riposa il suo corpo? Sono tutti questi gli interrogativi che questo avvocato nato a Meknès (Marocco), che ha conosciuto da vicino il leader marocchino, solleva in questo libro di 500 pagine.
Se i Fratelli Musulmani e Hezbollah si prendono il meglio
Posted By Lara Setrakian
Tuesday, October 26, 2010 - 1:56 PM
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In 2009 the Muslim Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Mohammed Mehdi Akef voluntarily stepped aside -- the first time a top leader in the movement had voluntarily resigned before reaching death's door. His message, as Michele Dunne of the Carnegie Endowment describes it, was that ‘we old guys need to step aside -- I'm going to set an example.' This month Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Akef's counterpart in the ruling establishment, hinted he would run for a third term in office next year, extending his three decade rule.
Akef's resignation was the high note in a pitch that Islamist groups have repeatedly made: that they are more internally democratic and dynamic than their secular counterparts. It's a cultivated image that glosses over a deeply flawed system, one that can be just as autocratic and hostile to new ideas. But it is giving Islamist groups a competitive edge, especially in attracting and retaining a new generation of talented members.
Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood are the sharpest examples: they recruit young, smart entry-level members, sort them according to interest and expertise, and, in some cases, allow them to rise the ranks, with an emphasis on ideological purity and a populist touch. Through an internal political Darwinism, the process produced leaders who've have been able to outsmart and outmaneuver their secular rivals. It has also energized the lower ranks, where young volunteers then help run rallies, canvass for elections, or take up arms.
‘An educated, politically interested young person from some secondary Egyptian city would certainly be attracted to the Muslim Brotherhood over the NDP,' said Steven Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations. ‘It is clear that is where the political dynamism is.'
I tested the idea with Ramy Raoof, a 23-year-old digital activist from Egypt's Al Minya province. I asked whether he and his contemporaries -- middle class recent college graduates -- were attracted to the Muslim Brotherhood's mix of ideology, social services, and opportunity for engagement. He steered away from the movement and into an NGO on human rights. But his friends were attracted by the Muslim Brotherhood's pitch.
"The Brotherhood is getting more young people to join them by offering different things," Raoof told me. Those things include college fees, cheap textbooks, and money to defray the cost of getting married.
"But they'll also say, ‘Come join us and we will make you general manager of this, or head counselor of that. Some sexy title,'" Raoof explained. "It's part of how they attract people. Some people are looking forward to being leaders, and the Brotherhood use these kind of opportunities to get people to join. "
In Raoof and others there is evidence that political Islam is winning the war for talent, attracting a greater share of the young, smart, and politically inclined than the secular establishment. It's partly because for decades, Islamist groups have been the most viable opposition, harnessing public frustration and outlasting secular leftists who've been stamped out by the regime. As the primary opposition, Islamists have been driven by necessity to attract and make room for entry-level activists, who in turn boost their claims of popular legitimacy.
April 6 and Mohammed El Baradei's National Association for Change are adopting some of the same grassroots tactics and attracting some of the young political talent. But the Muslim Brotherhood has a long lead and an enormous base -- part of the reason Baradei has partnered with them to get his movement off the ground.
To say that political Islam may be winning the war for talent requires a working definition of ‘talent.' I don't mean the MBAs and Ivy League graduates, who'd likely find a place in the ruling establishment (in part because they often come from it). I am thinking of the Ramy Raoofs, the dynamic twenty-somethings with ideas and energy but no discernable ‘wastah,' or connections into the power elite. They are the majority by number, and their hearts and minds are in play. Where they land says much about the momentum and future direction of the Arab polity. Here, attracting ‘talent' means attracting focused, capable support.
Hezbollah has built itself on that kind of ‘talent.' While it filters doctors into its hospitals and teachers into its schools, in key roles it values street smarts, battle smarts, and emotional intelligence over formal qualifications. Alastair Crooke, a former British diplomat considered close to Hezbollah, says that during the 2006 war their units were led by men in their early 20s, making decisive moves on a largely autonomous basis. Crooke says they are selecting for young people who were ‘very knowledgeable and very self-effacing. It's not like ticking the box -- have you taken this course, have you had this degree? It's the ability to cast a spell, to cast a web, to have people follow you.'
But Lebanon, as usual, is a complicated case study. Within its sectarian system young talents generally stick to their own religious party -- Shiites to Hezbollah or Amal, Maronite Christians to the Lebanese Forces or Phalange, etc. Their bonds of allegiance may be stronger, because they are bonds of faith and ideology. But there is a limit to individual participation in that talent can rise, but the top spot is often held for scions of a political family. There are alternative outlets for activist energy, like civil society groups that promote culture, environmentalism, and the movement for a secular Lebanon. But when it comes to the major political parties, young upstarts are largely locked out.
One way Islamist groups have tapped in to that base is by creating diverse ways to participate; you can be a cleric in Hezbollah or attend one of its rallies in a miniskirt; you can lead your local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood or just collect signatures; you can join the volunteer police corps run by Hamas. That kind of easy-to-reach participation cements support and helps new recruits take the first step into their circle. But once in the system, can fresh faces really rise into leadership? That's where the system gets stuck.
In terms of real meritocracy, Islamists political movements have many of the same deficiencies as the secular establishment: they are largely autocratic, manipulated through patronage and often intolerant of dissent. 'There's still a complaint that the younger generation don't feel they have a chance,' said Carnegie's Michele Dunne. '‘[It can be] the leader for life phenomenon, undemocratic internal procedures, gerentocracies with old men holding onto their seats forever.'
Yet Islamists maintain a perceived meritocracy, along with a real opportunity to participate at the low- and mid-level. That gives them a strategic advantage in attracting and retaining many of the region's brightest and most dedicated minds. Having that human capital makes them better equipped and more resilient as the political forces of the Arab world collide.
Lara Setrakian is an ABC News reporter.
Gay musulmani abusati
Netherlands: Muslim gays abused in asylum centers
Netherlands: Muslim gays abused in asylum centersSecret Garden, an organization of Muslim gays and lesbians, says they've received 158 complaints in the past 18 months from gay asylum seekers who have been abused in asylum centers in the Netherlands.
"Somalis, Arabs, Iraqis, Iranians, who don't accept our homosexuality"
"I get cursed by them.. with quotes from the Koran"
Secret Garden published interviews with several asylum-seekers (PDF, NL) waiting in asylum centers in the Netherlands:Iyas (27), Palestinian, 5 years in asylum centers: I feel free here. The Netherlands is a dream country for me. At least, as long as Arab immigrants don't meddle with me. In the asylum center I feel very isolated. People from Somalia spit on me, call me the devil. I've been attacked on the street and seriously abused by one of the other residents. I've even lodged a complain about it. The COA says 'there are rules, but we can't change the opinions of these people'.
Mario (40), Georgian, 11 years in asylum centers: The people in the asylum center don't accept me. I can't go to the bathroom quietly. They are afraid when I want to talk to them. It pains me a lot that I'm discriminated.
Ahmed (28), Iraqi, currently in appeal after his asylum request was rejected: In the asylum center there were so many Iraqis, that I was afraid to say why I was here. So I kept my mouth shut. I wasn't able to trust people anymore. After a while, I got the courage to tell my real story. That was a very difficult moment, but I feel better now.
Ammar (43), Iraqi: In our view Europe is a safe place. But once in the asylum center, I was disappointed. We were cursed by other residents, spit on in our faces, they called us devils. But when they wanted to gratify their sexual needs, they looked us up.
Abdullah (24), Palestinian: Yes, freedom, I didn't feel much of it yet. Three times already, Muslims tried to kill me in the asylum center. They come into the shower with a knife. Or they say: suck my dick.. I stay as much as possible in my room.
Se il drone ce l'ha l'Iran
L’IRAN PRESENTA UN DRONE FATTO IN CASA 
Roma, 28 ottobre ‘10 (Fuoritutto) Nel corso di una cerimonia a cui hanno preso parte alti ufficiali delle forse armate lo scorso 21 agosto il presidente iraniano Ahmadinejad ha presentato un nuovo velivolo non pilotato chiamato Karrar (Bombardiere), primo sistema di questo tipo costruito in Iran. Secondo le agenzie di stato, il drone sarebbe in grado di condurre attacchi a lungo raggio fino a 1.000 km di distanza trasportando una bomba di 200 kg.
Ahmadinejad ha definito il Karrar un simbolo di morte per i nemici dell’Iran e un “messaggero di dignità per l’umanità” aggiungendo che il suo compito è di scoraggiare qualsiasi atto di aggressione straniero.
Nella stessa occasione il ministro della difesa Ahmad Vahidi ha specificato che l’Iran dispone di altri UAV con raggio d’azione superiore ai 1.000 km. Nel febbraio di quest’anno era già stata inaugurata la linea di produzione di due UAV di costruzione locale – denominati Ra’d e Nazir - con capacità di ricognizione e attacco. In precedenza, nel marzo 2009, era stata avviata la costruzione di UAV di vario tipo nella provincia settentrionale di Mazandaran. Il dirigente della Farnas Aerospace Company incaricata del progetto, ha dichiarato che la compagnia è impegnata da 9 anni nella progettazione e costruzione di velivoli non pilotati e che presso il sito saranno costruiti UAV tattici a corto raggio con un altitudine operativa compresa tra i 400 e i 500 metri, e con design stealth.
(Alb)
sabato 16 ottobre 2010
Chi è Bakir Izetbegovic
Portrait of Bakir IzetbegovicSon of the State's Founder and Winner of the Bosnian Elections
Bakir Izetbegovic, son of Alija Izetbegovic – the founder of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina – has been elected the Bosnian Muslims' representative in the joint presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Enver Robelli sends us this portrait
Bakir Izetbegovic says he intends to improve relations between Bosniaks, Serbs and Kroats. "I am the right person for this process of reconciliation," he claims The Bosniaks are the largest ethnic group in this Balkan state, ahead of the Serbs and the Croats. Although formally Muslims, not all Bosniaks are strict observers of Islam. In larger cities such as Sarajevo or Tuzla in particular, many define themselves as Bosniaks for the simple reason that they are not (Orthodox) Serbs or (Catholic) Croats.
In the hour of his triumph, Bakir Izetbegovic adopted a conciliatory tone. The newly elected representative of the Bosnian Muslims in the three-person joint presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina says that he wants to reach out to all ethnic groups and promote co-operation in the next four years. This, he says, is the only way to take the paralysed republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina forward.
Izetbegovic is soliciting the trust of his Serb and Croat colleagues in the joint presidency. The three members of the presidency are supposed to represent their country and shape its foreign and security policies. Chairmanship of the presidency rotates every eight months because Bosnia and Herzegovina is a highly complex state made up of the Croat-Muslim Federation and the Bosnian Serb constituent republic, Republika Srpska.
Scathing criticism and reconciliation
In Sarajevo, Bakir Izetbegovic is simply referred to as "the son". He benefits from the reputation of his father, Alija Izetbegovic, who died in 2003 and who, as the first president of the Bosnian state, organised resistance to Serb aggression in the 1990s.
He toned down his rhetoric for the election campaign. Izetbegovic knows that calls for the dissolution of the Republika Srpska only strengthen the hand of nationalist Serbs and their break-away tendencies. This is why he is calling for a policy of gradual rapprochement. "We Bosniaks [i.e. the Muslims] share the country with Serbs and Croats and have a common border with Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro. We have to improve relations," he emphasises, adding "I believe that I am the right person for this process of reconciliation."
Bakir Izetbegovic was born in 1956 in Sarajevo, where he studied architecture. That was in the early 1980s, when his father was sentenced to 14 years in prison by the communist regime because of his "Islamic Declaration", which called for a national and religious Muslim revival.
Shortly before the collapse of Yugoslavia, Alija Izetbegovic founded the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which remains the most important Muslim political force in the country to this day. His son Bakir is a leading member of the SDA. It is said in Sarajevo that he controls the intransparent construction business in the capital. He is married to a gynaecologist; the couple has one adult daughter.
Enver Robelli
© Süddeutsche Zeitung/Qantara.de 2010
Translated from the German by Aingeal Flanagan
Editor: Lewis Gropp/Qantara.de
Educare le donne per il futuro della Somalia
Helpless Somalis Eye Education for Survival
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Many Somali refugees see education as their only way of survival. (Google)
NAIROBI – Like thousands of her fellow Somalis, Kauthar Asad is leading a miserable life in refugee camps in neighbouring Kenya. But the young girl has a boundless dream; pursuing education to draw a bright future for her war-ravaged nation.
“Getting education is a priority in my life,” Asad told OnIslam.net on Thursday, October 14.
“It is not just for me but also for the progress of my family, my people and my country.”
Born to refugee parents in Kenya, Asad grew up in hard-scrabbling living conditions in the camps, where access to basic needs is almost a nightmare.
Her miserable life, however, did not stand a bloc to her dream of getting education.
“When I grow up I will be a doctor, I want to help my people back home in Somalia.
“I know it is not as easy to get the kind of education I need in a refugee camp like this,” said a determined Asad.
“But I believe where there is a will there is always a way out.”
A six-grader at Friends Primary School, Asad is living an almost nightmare in pursuing her education.
There are neither adequate books, proper latrines nor enough teachers to help Asad, and her likes, to pursue their education.
“I remind myself always and always that I have to be an extraordinary girl to reach my target,” said Asad.
“The situation is very challenging.”
Somalia has fallen into abyss over deadly clashes between government troops and rebel groups fighting to topple the government of President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.
About 200,000 civilians are believed to have fled the continuing violence in Mogadishu thus far this year.
The violence has forced hundreds of thousands of helpless Somalis to flee their homes.
Survival
Living on the margin the refugee camps, Asad sees education as the only way of survival for helpless Somalis.
“Things here are very difficult, you have to think about how to survive,” says Asad.
“But then I believe schooling is the key to achieve what I want to be in life.”
Despite their difficult life, Asad’s family is also determined to help their daughter get the highest level of education.
“My daughter has a big dream,” says her mother Sahara Abdillahi.
“She is a teenager but she has taken care of her education.
“I am thrilled,” says the Somali mother. “I have nine children all born in this camp and I have all sent them to school expect two young ones.”
Somalia is one of four countries, where more than 70 percent of the population is illiterate.
According to UN estimates, only one in every four Somali girls of primary school-age is enrolled in school – one of the lowest rates worldwide.
Determined to have her dream fulfilled, Asad now leads a group of nearly 20 girl guides in her primary school to empower young girls to get education.
“When I started going to school, I had to go against a culture that did not promote girls’ education, where poverty was a barrier,” she says.
“Now we are going round the camps to put across a message that girls should be taken to schools.
“We need to educate girls if we want a bright future for Somalia.”
giovedì 14 ottobre 2010
Hizb al-Islam: islamisti nazionali
Somalia's Second Islamist Threat: A Backgrounder on Hizb al Islam
Created 10/08/2010 - 11:40
Current As Of:Fri, 10/08/2010 - 11:27Run-down tank in Somalia. (Photo by Najeeb, available on Flickr.)
Introduction
The Islamist militant group al Shabaab continues to pose the greatest threat to stability in Somalia, and has only strengthened its positions within the country since Ethiopia’s withdrawal in January 2009. The fragile Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has limited territory in most of the country and now controls only a few square kilometers in Mogadishu. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is the only military force preventing the TFG’s collapse, but it has a strictly defensive mandate, and the pro-government Sufi militia Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a lacks the military capacity to defeat al Shabaab on its own. Another Islamist militant group, Hizb al Islam, has suffered over the past year from al Shabaab’s rise despite a nominal alliance between the groups.
Hizb al Islam has endured many defections due to the disparate interests of its factions and successive military defeats. Nonetheless, the group still holds and administers several strategic locations in and around Mogadishu, and the coastal town Harardhere in Mudug region. Its militias continue to conduct operations, and it counts some of the nation’s most prominent and influential clan leaders and clerics among its ranks. It may not pose the threat within Somalia and internationally that al Shabaab does, yet it continues to act as a destabilizing force in the country.
HISTORY
Violence has plagued Somalia since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. The present conflict that pits Islamists against the Somali TFG and its African Union backers began in 2006. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an East African bloc comprised of Somalia and its neighbors, established the TFG as an interim government in 2004 to bring stability to the war-torn country.[1] The TFG was ineffective, however, and religious factions arose to fill the power-vacuum in Somalia. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of regional Islamist administrations aiming to implement varying interpretations of Islamic law, took control of Mogadishu by June 2006 and expanded its authority throughout most of southern and central Somalia. Fearing the regional implications of an extremist and irredentist government next-door, Ethiopia invaded Somalia with U.S. backing and disbanded the ICU.[2] The group’s primary militia, now known as Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (or “al Shabaab”), stayed in Somalia to fight the Ethiopians, but most ICU leaders fled the country and took refuge in Eritrea.
In September 2007, two of the former ICU leaders, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Sheikh Dahir Aweis, spearheaded the creation of a new opposition group from exile in the Eritrean capital Asmara called the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). The ARS was, at the onset, a coalition of both moderate politicians and hard-line ICU clerics and politicians united against reconciliation talks with Ethiopia until its military withdrew from Somalia. The ARS supported guerilla action against Ethiopian military forces in Somalia, while discussing a political solution with foreign negotiators.[3]
In May 2008, the ARS leadership fractured and its coalition collapsed after Ahmed engaged the TFG in reconciliation talks in Djibouti. Aweis denounced the discussion, calling it a “waste of time” that did not represent the ARS as a body.[4] Ahmed responded by publicly deriding Eritrea and Aweis for working against ARS unity and reiterated his support for the UN-backed reconciliation effort.[5] The TFG and Ahmed’s faction within the ARS reached an accord in June 2008, which Aweis immediately rejected as untenable and illegitimate.[6] Aweis’s refusal to participate in the reconciliation talks cemented the divide between him and Ahmed, as well as their respective wings of the ARS.
In January 2009, Ethiopia completed its military withdrawal from Somalia and handed control of the country to the rebranded TFG; however, al Shabaab vowed to continue its campaign of violence.[7] The Somali parliament voted to double its size to 550 members to comply with the Djibouti agreement, with most of the new representation going to the ARS.[8] The restructured Somali parliament elected the moderate Ahmed president as a compromise suitable to both existing parliamentarians and the body’s new Islamist bloc.[9] However, several prominent clan-based factions rejected the compromise as illegitimate following the election and created Hizb al Islam in protest.[10]
The hard-line clerics of the Asmara-based ARS – led at the time by Aweis – joined with the Ras Kamboni Brigade, Anoole, and Jabhatul Islam to form Hizb al Islam in early February 2009 with Sheikh Omar Iman Abubakar at the group’s helm. Iman Abubakar denounced the new Ahmed government as equally undesirable as the previous one. He said, "The so-called government led by Sharif Sheik Ahmed is not different from the one of Abdulahi Yusuf [the previous TFG president]. The country was not freed from the enemy and shari’a law was not imposed, how we can stop Jihad?"[11] Muse Abdi Arale, then Hizb al Islam’s spokesman, threatened to fight any TFG forces that entered neighborhoods under his group’s control.[12]
Tensions between the TFG and Hizb al Islam appeared to be quelled when President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed announced on February 28 that he had accepted a ceasefire with the group mediated by prominent Somali clerics. "I met with religious leaders and elders and accepted their demand for ceasefire and reconciliation with the opposition members, and I call on all opposition parties to halt the unnecessary violence," he said.[13] The principal term of the agreement was an immediate implementation of shari’a (Islamic law) by the TFG, which Ahmed also claimed to have accepted. The supposed truce was short-lived, however, for Arale spoke out against the ceasefire, calling reports of an accord “baseless.” Arale said his group had met with mediators, but said they only discussed a partial withdrawal, not a comprehensive ceasefire.[14]
Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweis re-entered the picture several days later from Asmara, criticizing Ahmed and denouncing the TFG as an instrument of Ethiopia’s interests against Islam and Somali nationalism.
"Ethiopia blindly supported and praised Sharif [Ahmed], and that shows the country is still run by Ethiopians and their agents, and that is why we are fighting. They are fighting to stop any group that can employ shari’a law in Somalia, so this is a religious war. When invaders come in and try to force you to leave our religion, reject your nationhood and independence, and take your resources illegally, there is no option left but to fight," he said.[15]
Iman Abubakar echoed Aweis’s sentiments, even adding that AMISOM was a tool of the United States in its war on Islam: "I want to remind the Somali people that the Burundian and Ugandan troops were trained by American forces and were sent to Somalia to fight with the (Mujahidin) holy war fighters and they do not want peace to prevail in Somalia."[16] Instead of political reconciliation with the TFG, Hizb al Islam aligned with al Shabaab in militant opposition to the government. Al Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, also known as Abu Mansur, thanked Hizb al Islam on March 16, 2009 for its collaborative efforts against pro-government forces in the Galgudud region of central Somalia.[17]
IDEOLOGY
Hizb al Islam fuses radical Islam and Somali nationalism; unlike al Shabaab it incorporates clan interests, and has not adopted a global jihadist mission.[18] Although Aweis pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda several times, and has welcomed both into Somalia, foreign fighters have not joined the ranks of Hizb al Islam they way they have with al Shabaab.[19]
Hizb al Islam set two conditions for the end of its hostilities against the TFG: the implementation of shari’a as Somali federal law and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country. These conditions have not changed despite the adoption of shari’a by the TFG in April 2009 because the version implemented by it was perceived as too weak by the Islamists.[20] Hizb al Islam created its own Islamic administration to govern Somalia on May 22, 2010, although the group held little territory outside southern Mogadishu at the time.[21]
The group had also used shari’a as a justification for many of its actions. In a November 2009 meeting with businessmen in Mogadishu, Aweis justified his mission against the Somali government by saying, “join the war because we are fighting to liberate our people and rule them with the shari’a law.”[22] The group justified its May 2010 seizure of the port town of Harardhere from pirates’ control on the basis of installing shari’a. “Harardhere was experiencing insecurity, and that is why we captured it and implemented shari’a law," the group’s statement read.[23] Likewise, its creation of an administration in Mudug cited installing shari’a as a driving factor. “We have been welcomed by the people in nearly 30 villages and settlements in Mudug region. The Muslim people in this part want our shari’a based rule,” said the group’s spokesman, Sheikh Mohamed Osman Arus.[24]
Hizb al Islam has held non-governmental organizations to an Islamic standard of practices, shutting down those that it claims do not meet its expected level of assistance.[25] In one instance, the group attacked a Doctors Without Borders Clinic in Hawa Abdi, near Mogadishu, and forced it to shut down in May 2010.[26] Aweis also called for Somalis to support those who have been displaced by fighting during the holy month of Ramadan.[27] Like al Shabaab, Aweis banned activities such as watching soccer, forced men to grow beards, and enforced harsh restrictions on journalists and radio stations.[28] On September 19, Hizb al Islam militants raided the Global Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) station in Mogadishu and seized its broadcast equipment. Earlier in 2010, the group issued an order to all radio stations to cease playing music or it would shut them down.[29]
RELATIONSHIP WITH AL SHABAAB
The relationship between Hizb al Islam and al Shabaab has fluctuated between strategic alliance and all-out conflict. On May 7, 2009, Hizb al Islam and al Shabaab commenced a joint offensive against the TFG in Mogadishu.[30] The Islamists initially made significant gains in the city, capturing buildings and roads previously held by the TFG.[31] However, the drive stalled after AMISOM troops intervened and pro-government forces launched a counterattack on May 22.[32] The TFG subsequently regained many strategic locations, and the Islamists’ May offensive ended in stalemate.[33]
On June 3, 2009 Aweis announced he and al Shabaab senior leadership were discussing a comprehensive and imminent merger of the two militant groups. Yet several al Shabaab leaders refuted his claims and said that while the groups shared military goals, they would not fight under the same banner.[34]
The first major public confrontation between Hizb al Islam and al Shabaab erupted in July 2009 after Hizb al Islam militants captured two French security advisers in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab demanded Hizb al Islam turn both over to its custody, however, the latter initially refused.[35] In order to “avert bloodshed,” Aweis said he ordered the Frenchmen’s captors to hand both men over to al Shabaab, although Hizb al Islam ultimately retained one of them.[36]
Aweis continued to insist that unity talks between the groups were underway; he said on July 24, 2009 that they must merge in order to successfully administer an Islamist Somalia.[37] One month later, on August 24, he attempted to quell rumors that he was negotiating a settlement with the TFG and reiterated his commitment to Islamist unity. "I have never dreamed of joining [the TFG]...but there are direct talks between us [Hizb al Islam] and our brothers, Al Shabaab," he said.[38] Nonetheless, the merger never materialized, and increasing tensions sparked open conflict in October. Hizb al Islam and al Shabaab had agreed to the shared governance of Kismayo, a lucrative port town in southern Somalia, whereby the two would rotate administrations every six months.[39] However, al Shabaab refused to surrender control of the town to Hizb al Islam after its term expired, and Hizb al Islam began to protest in late August.[40]
By late September both sides were preparing for conflict, which erupted on October 1.[41] Al Shabaab’s forces quickly and decisively routed Hizb al Islam from the town.[42] Despite a truce agreement recognizing Kismayo as al Shabaab’s, the sides continued to fight throughout southern Somalia.[43] Ultimately, al Shabaab neutralized and assimilated the principal Hizb al Islam opposition faction in the south, the Ras Kamboni Brigade.[44] After losing its southern holdings, Hizb al Islam’s fighters moved north and concentrated in central Somalia where they could reconsolidate power. However, this attempt largely failed. Hizb al Islam was unable to wrest control of the strategic town Dhusa Mareb[45] from Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a, and lost Beledweyne to al Shabaab.[46]
In June 2010, Hizb al Islam’s Hiraan administration withdrew from Beledweyne, a strategic central town,[47] and defected to al Shabaab.[48] Since then, the groups have continued to fight each other sporadically in Mogadishu for control of key positions in the city’s northern districts, but most recently launched a joint attack against AMISOM troops.[49] On July 10, sources from both militant groups reported unity talks between Aweis and al Shabaab leader Abdi Mohamud Godane, also known as Abu Zubair, which were allegedly mediated by foreign al Qaeda militants.[50] Various media reports later that month, citing unnamed sources from both groups, claimed the discussions broke down. Both Hizb al Islam and al Shabaab publicly rejected those allegations as false and maintained that unity talks were still underway.[51]
CURRENT POSITIONS
Hizb al Islam currently holds limited territory. The last major offensive operation it conducted independently of al Shabaab was on May 2, 2010 when militants seized the port city of Harardhere in the Mudug region for “security” purposes and drove out the city’s pirates.[52] On May 12, Sheikh Mohamed Osman Arus announced that Hizb al Islam was establishing a new Mudug administration in Harardhere.[53] The group still holds the city and maintains a nominal Mudug administration, but has not made further gains in the region since that announcement.[54]
Hizb al Islam still holds several strategic districts in and around Mogadishu, and it continues to carry out smaller-scale operations in the city. Its principal stronghold is Afgoi,[55] a strategic town 25 kilometers west of Mogadishu. On September 13, its militants raided Lafole, a town roughly halfway between Afgoi and Mogadishu, desecrating graves and destroying IDP camps.[56] The group also holds several positions in Mogadishu’s northern districts. The Yaqshid district police station was the site of some particularly deadly clashes between Hizb al Islam and al Shabaab during their infighting.[57] Since the Islamists launched their joint Ramadan offensive in August, Hizb al Islam has been very active against TFG and its allied forces, particularly in the Hodan and Hawl Wadag districts.[58] The GBC radio station Hizb al Islam attacked in September is in the Heliwa district, suggesting a presence for the group there as well.[59]
CONCLUSION
Despite its struggles over the past year, Hizb al Islam remains a threat to pro-government forces and contributes to instability in Somalia. Its commitment to a radical Islamist ideology and connections to prominent clans in the country make it an appealing compromise for Somalis who reject the TFG but distrust the foreign elements within al Shabaab. Hizb al Islam’s battle with al Shabaab in Kismayo in October 2009 sparked a period of decline for the group, whereby it lost all influence in Somali’s southern regions. The defections of its Hiraan administration and Ras Kamboni to al Shabaab further weakened Hizb al Islam. As a result, the Asmara wing of the ARS is now the undisputed force behind Hizb al Islam with control of Harardhere, Afgoi, and several northern districts in Mogadishu. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweis ultimately controls the fate of Hizb al Islam, and any formal shift in allegiance to al Shabaab is dependent upon him.
[1] “The World Factbook: Somalia,” Central Intelligence Agency, August 30, 2010. Available:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html[2] Barbara Slavin, “U.S. support key to Ethiopia’s invasion,” USA Today, January 8, 2007. Available: http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-01-07-ethiopia_x.htmJack Kimball, “Islamist to lead Somali opposition,” Reuters, September 14, 2007. Available: http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL1490107520070914[3] “Somali opposition alliance begins fight against Ethiopia,” AFP, September 20, 2007. Available: http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hIcARdyjMUukX3jKVh3Mje2M-wag[4] “Somalia opposition chief criticizes Eritrea govt,” Garowe, May 25, 2008. Available: http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Africa_22/Somalia_opposition_chief_criticizes_Eritrea_govt.shtml[5] “Somalia opposition chief criticizes Eritrea govt,” Garowe, May 25, 2008. Available: http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Africa_22/Somalia_opposition_chief_criticizes_Eritrea_govt.shtml[6] “Cautious welcome for UN-brokered peace deal in Somalia,” Garowe, June 10, 2008. Available: http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Cautious_welcome_for_UN-brokered_peace_deal_in_Somalia.shtml[7] “Somali joy as Ethiopians withdraw,” BBC, January 13, 2009. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7825626.stm[8] “Somali Parliament Approves Expansion Before Presidential Vote,” VOA, January 26, 2009. Available: http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-01-26-voa48-68712067.html[9] Mohammed Adow, “Somalia at a crossroads,” Al Jazeera, February 24, 2009. Available: http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/02/200922393740632257.html[10] “Somalia: Islamists Want to Keep Fighting Against the New Government,” Shabelle Media Network, February 7, 2009. 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Available: http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2009/05/10/4172092.htm[31] “Somalia: Islamists, ‘Foreign Fighters’ Make Gains in Mogadishu, Garowe, May 11, 2009. Available: http://allafrica.com/stories/200905110070.html[32] “Several dead in Mogadishu attack,” Al Jazeera, May 26, 2009. Available: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/05/2009526195050474759.html[33] “Somalia: Government Soldiers Recapture Yaqshid Police Station,” Shabelle Media Network, June 4, 2009. Available: http://allafrica.com/stories/200906031069.html[34] “Somalia: Al Shabaab rejects Aweys ‘unity’ proposal,” Garowe, June 3, 2009. Available: http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Al_Shabaab_reject_Aweys_unity_proposal.shtml[35] Abdi Guled, “Islamist rebels holding French hostages,” Reuters, July 16, 2009. Available: http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE56E3ZD20090716[36] “Somalia: French Hostages Surrendered ‘To Avert Bloodshed’ –Aweys,” Garowe, July 18, 2009. Available: http://allafrica.com/stories/200907200458.htmlMatthew Campbell, “French agent Marc Aubriere’s amazing barefoot escape through Mogadishu,” The Australian, August 31, 2009. Available: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/french-agent-marc-aubrieres-amazing-barefoot-escape-through-mogadishu/story-e6frg6so-1225767742461[37] “Somalia: Sheik Aweys Says ‘Efforts to Unite Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahadeen And Hizbul Islam Continue,’” Shabelle Media Network, July 24, 2009. Available: http://allafrica.com/stories/200907240833.html[38] “Somalia: Aweys Urges War, Army Commander Threatens Opposition,” Garowe, August 24, 2009. http://allafrica.com/stories/200908250541.html[39] “Somalia: Islamists on a ‘war footing’ in Kismayo,” IRIN, September 29, 2009. Available: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=86338[40] “Fighting kills at least 3 in Mogadishu outskirts,” Reuters, August 27, 2009. Available: http://af.reuters.com/article/idAFJOE57Q0FL20090827[41] “Somalia: Islamists on a ‘war footing’ in Kismayo,” IRIN, September 29, 2009. Available: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=86338[42] Somalia: Al Shabaab seize control of Kismayo after battle,” Garowe, October 1, 2009. Available: http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Al_Shabaab_seizes_control_of_Kismayo_after_battle.shtml[43] “Somali Islamist foes say port conflict resolves,” AFP, October 7, 2009. Available: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hWQW7Twpa7Z9ZN3R7NcyVeacGHtQ[44] “Somali Islamists al-Shabaab ‘join al-Qaeda fight,” BBC, February 1, 2010. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8491329.stm[45] Dhusa Mareb is the administrative capital of the Galgudud region and also lies on Somalia’s major north-south highway.[46] Abdi Guled and Abdi Sheikh, “Rights group says fighting in central Somalia kills 24,” Reuters, June 2, 2010. Available: http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE6511T220100602Abdulkadir Khalif, “Somalia’s Hizbu Islam May Be Nearing Its End,” Daily Nation, June 14, 2010. Available: http://allafrica.com/stories/201006141859.html[47] Beledweyne is the administrative capital of the central Hiraan province. It also lies on the Shabelle, one of the country’s two major rivers, as well as Somalia’s major north-south highway.[48] Abdulkadir Khalif, “Somalia’s Hizbu Islam May Be Nearing Its End,” Daily Nation, June 14, 2010. Available: http://allafrica.com/stories/201006141859.html[49] “Attack Claims Soccer Fans in Somalia,” Independent Online, July 8, 2010. Available: http://www.iol.co.za/sport/attack-claims-soccer-fans-in-somalia-1.620244Hamsa Omar, “Somalia Fighting Kills 13 Civilians, African Union Plans to Bolster Force,” Bloomberg, July 28, 2010. Available: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-28/somalia-fighting-kills-13-civilians-african-union-plans-to-bolster-force.html[50] “Somalia’s top Islamist leaders in unity talks,” AFP, July 10, 2010. Available: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5irS90-on69foc2Og6GR7484RocCA[51] Hamsa Omar, “Somali Insurgent Groups Say They Plan to Join Forces to Fight Government,” Bloomberg, 2, 2010. Available: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-02/somali-insurgent-groups-say-they-plan-to-join-forces-to-fight-government.html[52] Matthew Clark, “Islamists seize main port used by Somali pirates,” Christian Science Monitor, May 2, 2010. Available: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2010/0502/Islamists-seize-main-port-used-by-Somali-pirates[53] Abdulkadir Khalif, “Radical group to set up new Somalia administration,” Daily Nation, May 12, 2010. Available: http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/Radical%20group%20to%20set%20up%20new%20Somalia%20administration/-/1066/917144/-/4hvv09/-/[54] “Spokesman: there is no fighting between Al-shabab, Hizbul Islam,” Mareeg, August 19, 2010. Available: http://mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=17025&tirsan=3&PHPSESSID=d0f295be9d4179a5362626278555abe6[55] Afgoi is on the western outskirts of Mogadishu and controls access to the city from south and west Somalia due to its location on the country’s major north-south highway.[56] “Hizb al Islam wipes out 50 graves, IDP houses in Lafole,” Mareeg, September 13, 2010. Available: http://mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=17267&tirsan=3[57] “10 killed as Somali militants fight in Mogadishu,” Garowe, June 22, 2010. Available: http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/10_killed_as_Somali_militants_fight_in_Mogadishu.shtml[58] “Clashes Kill 20, Injuire 30 Others in Somali Capital for the 6th Day,” Mareeg, August 28, 2010. Available: http://www.mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=17114&tirsan=3“AMISOM Loses 4 Soldiers in Mortar Shell in Mogadishu,” Mareeg, August 30, 2010. Available: http://www.mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=17139&tirsan=3[59] “Somali Insurgents Seized Media Stations in Mogadishu,” Garowe, September 20, 2010. Available: http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somali_insurgents_seized_Media_Stations_in_Mogadishu.shtml