Asharq Alawsat reports that discussion are underway concerning the creation of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs in Saudi Arabia. In one sense, this isn’t a good thing: it tends continues the already exaggerated segregation of women and men. In another sense, though, it does raise the status of women in general and would double the number of women in the Saudi Cabinet. There is no argument, I would think, that women do face different challenges than men, though sometimes a little too much is made of those differences, IMO. Many countries, though not the US, do have ministries dedicated to women’s affairs. The issues facing Saudi women, though, are so different, from those facing Saudi men, often uniquely so, that I believe this proposed ministry is a necessity.
Saudi Looks into Possible Ministry for Women’s Affairs
Iman Al-KhattafDammam, Asharq Al-Awsat- The establishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs’ in the Kingdom could soon be a reality, Asharq al Awsat can reveal.
Sources revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat that this proposal has been brought to the attention of higher authorities lately, after it was recommended in a study commissioned by the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce. The proposal is expected to initiate a qualitative shift for Saudi women, and will perhaps mark a turning point between the period before the Ministry, and the future.
The proposal was revealed by Dr Basmah Umayr, the Executive Director of Al-Sayyidah Khadijah Bint Khuwaylid Center in the Jeddah Chamber, without giving a timeframe for its implementation. She said that the Women’s Ministry would contribute to “the transportation of women to [the level] of decision-making”. When asked about the problem of overlapping jurisdiction with other groups and ministries involved in providing services for women, she denied that this would be the case. “There will be joint objectives, with each group contributing according to its specialty,” she said.
Umayr said there were predominantly two contrasting opinions regarding the proposed ministry. One view opposes the proposal, on the grounds that it would in fact differentiate women from the rest of society. The other view supports the proposal, believing that the ministry would emphasize that women are now able to achieve the positions they previously hoped for. “Globally, we found upon studying the situation that many developed countries still reserve a ministry for women,” she said. “Women’s affairs are limitless, and there are many issues related to them.”
…
mercoledì 29 settembre 2010
Ministro delle donne
martedì 28 settembre 2010
La spirale irachena
Iraq: “oggi peggio di due mesi fa e meglio di fra due mesi"
Riccardo Redaelli , 23/09/2010
La speranza è che dopo Eid al-Fitr, la lunga festa che segna la fine del digiuno del mese di ramadan, i maggiori partiti iracheni siano infine capaci di interrompere il lunghissimo stallo che dalle scorse elezioni paralizza il quadro politico iracheno. Dal marzo scorso, infatti, quando si tennero le elezioni politiche generali, il paese è bloccato per l'incapacità di raggiungere un accordo da parte dei due “vincitori” della contesa elettorale, l'ex primo ministro Iyad Allawi e il primo ministro Nuri al-Maliki.
Il primo guida l'alleanza elettorale Iraqiyya, risultata il maggior partito, sia pure per pochissimi seggi, e ha presentato una piattaforma politica anti-settaria e secolarizzante. Al-Maliki, primo ministro uscente, ritiene tuttavia di avere maggiori chance nel formare il governo e accusa Allawi di rappresentare solo gli interessi dei sunniti e dei nostalgici del vecchio regime, proponendosi come l'unica formazione capace di mediare fra le tre diverse comunità principali, sciiti, sunniti e curdi. A rendere più complesso il quadro gli interessi, i veti incrociati e i tatticismi delle altre alleanze elettorali, fra tutte quella dei curdi e dell'altro raggruppamento sciita, formato dall'ISCI – uscito pesantemente penalizzato dal voto – e dagli sciiti radicali di Muqtada al-Sadr.
Lo stallo sta producendo effetti fortemente negativi a livello di sicurezza (con l'aumento delle violenze e degli attacchi terroristici), nel campo economico e della ricostruzione (finora fallimentare) e genera un crescente allontanamento del “paese reale” – piagato dalla mancanza dei beni primari (acqua e luce sono ancora intermittenti) e da una forte disoccupazione o sotto-occupazione – da quello politico. Una battuta fra le più in voga attualmente a Baghdad è quella che descrive così la situazione politica: «oggi è peggio di due mesi fa e meglio di fra due mesi».
Una visione pessimista che rispecchia la precarietà dell'assetto istituzionale e politico del nuovo Iraq e che rischia di vanificare tutti i successi degli ultimi anni nel campo della lotta contro i jihadisti guidati da al-Qa'ida, le milizie radicali, oppositori vari o semplici bande di delinquenti. Certo le forze jihadiste appaiono ormai marginalizzate e incapaci di abbattere con la forza il nuovo sistema istituzionale post Saddam. Ma è evidente come l'instabilità politica favorisca un aumento degli attentati e delle violenze, spesso utilizzate cinicamente tanto dai politici iracheni quanto dai paesi regionali limitrofi. Se lo stallo fra al-Maliki e Allawi dovesse incancrenirsi, il risultato sarebbe la nascita di un esecutivo affidato a una personalità minore, che rischia di non avere una maggioranza certa e che dovrà probabilmente affrontare una nuova radicalizzazione delle tensioni etnico-settarie.
In questo scenario, l'alleanza curda potrebbe essere tentata di indebolire ulteriormente i propri legami con il centro, dando vita a un'indipendenza mascherata delle province curde. Ciò farebbe precipitare le relazioni curdo-arabe nelle zone miste (Mosul e Kirkuk in primis) e provocherebbe un aumento delle interferenze dei paesi confinanti, i quali – sia pure per ragioni diverse – non vogliono una frammentazione del Paese (pur perseguendo politiche che da anni minano il consolidamento del nuovo ordine politico post Saddam). Una situazione pericolosissima e che potrebbe favorire colpi di mano militari, soprattutto dopo la partenza degli ultimi militari statunitensi prevista per la seconda metà del 2011.
La soluzione auspicata da molti – soprattutto a Washington – è al contrario la composizione di un governo di larghe intese, con un compromesso fra al-Maliki e Allawi che sancisca una spartizione del potere politico e permetta un temporaneo superamento della contrapposizione politica.
In ogni caso, restano fondamentali riforme costituzionali che riequilibrino i poteri degli organi dello Stato, ora troppo favorevoli al primo ministro. Parimenti, non sono più rinviabili decisioni attese ormai da cinque anni, come la legge per la distribuzione dei proventi degli idrocarburi fra centro e periferia, un compromesso sulle “città contese” fra curdi e arabi (Kirkuk e Mosul) e una maggiore tutela delle minoranze. Fra tutte quella cristiana, oggetto da anni di violenze brutali e vessazioni che rischiano di cancellare la più antica comunità presente in Iraq: senza di essa, il paese perderebbe una parte di se stesso.
lunedì 27 settembre 2010
Arabia Saudita: una licenza per i bloggers
The latest announcement from the spokesperson of the Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information Abdulrahman Al Hazzaa has created a storm of reactions on social media websites and blogs. The announcement stated that all Saudi Arabian web publishers and online media, including blogs and forums, will need to be officially registered with the government. Both Saudis and non Saudis protested the new law. On Twitter, the protest ran under the hashtag #haza3 - which refers to the ministry official’s last name.
Below are some of the reactions.In his blog, Crossroads Arabia John Burgess describes the decision as controlling:
Once upon a time, the Saudi Ministry of Culture & Information was able to control what people said and heard through the media. It basically owned it all, if not literally, then through a tight hand on the controls. Newer media has made that level of control impossible, much as that disappoints some.
From Twitter iamsoos felt sorry for her blog:
مدونتي العزيزة أرسل لك باقات التعزية والأسى ! فأنت مخالفة .. ابتعدي عن اشارات المراقبة فأنتِ بلاتصريح #Haza3My dear blog, I send you my condolences. You're not licensed!Others decided to be sarcastic about the whole issue. kabdu says:
انا قررت إني أفتح مدونه في النت لوق , إيش الأوراق المطلوبة ؟؟ #Haza3I decided to start my own Netblog, what are the the official forms I am supposed to fill?and Fouad Alfarhan adds:
من يسجل مدونته ومعلوماته عند وزارة الإعلام اختياريا كما قالوا هو مثل من يبلغ وزارة المياه بجدول أوقات استحمامه #Haza3Those who optionally register their blogs and information with the Ministry of Information as they say, should also report their shower times to the Ministry of Waterand Abdulaziz Fagih suggests a new law:
نطمح من الدولة بأصدار خطة مستقبلية لجعل دخول الحمامات بتصريح رسمي أو مرسوم ملكي لحامله #KSA #Haza3We want the government to issue a future plan to make going to toilets permissible only after getting official or royal ordersMoreover, the announcement has gotten many bloggers upset. In her blog, Saudi Women questions Saudi citizen's freedom of speech:
Aren’t our freedoms curbed enough? Am I going to need written permission from my guardian to maintain this blog? Do I need a paper from work too? Do I have to run everything by the ministry before posting? How about if instead of blogging, bloggers wrote the exact same stuff in consecutive Tweets and on Facebook notes, what are they going to do about that? Are we supposed to register our Facebook and Twitter accounts too?
Likewise, Sultan Aljumairy express his disturbance in a very angry blog post:
إلى أي نقطة تاريخية يراد بنا أن نعود ! حتى الكلام كثير علينا !To which point in history do they want us to return? Even expressing ourselves is too much nowAs a result of the huge storm of reactions, the next day Al-Hazzaa denied that there will be any form of registration required from bloggers and forum owners. He added that the new regulation will only be applied to electronic newspapers. The ministry claims that the spokesperson Al Hazzaa was misunderstood.
The denial has sparked reactions on new media and its effectiveness on the officials.
Fawaz Saad points how Twitter is now a powerful tool:
تراجع سريع! تويتر صار يخوف #NewE3lam #haza3Quick back out! Twitter is scaryWhile some wondered why the denial came from foreign Press.
Samar Almoossa says:
#Haza3 استغربت أن يأتي النفي من وكالة الأنباء الفرنسية ، ليس لدينا وكالة أنباء وقنوات ؟ آم الرسالة عالمية ولا شأن للشعب فيها ؟I was surprised the denial came from AFP, don't we have local news agencies? Or this is an international message which we the citizens have nothing to do with?Finally, Alfarhan suggests a loophole for electronic newspapers:
لو كنت صاحب صحيفة إلكترونية لأعدت تقديمها على أنها مدونة جماعية تهرباً من طلب التصريح #Haza3If I were the owner of an electronic newspaper I would have introduced it as a group blog to evade the permit application
Sunniti e sciiti nei paesi del Golfo
26/09/2010
Original Version: تزايد التوتر بين السنة والشيعة بدول الخليج… ومحاولات لاحتوائه
Le ultime settimane hanno registrato un crescendo di tensioni a sfondo confessionale nel Golfo, dove in paesi come il Kuwait e il Bahrein si stanno moltiplicando i provvedimenti contro esponenti o partiti sciiti, ed in alcuni casi si registra un inasprimento della retorica antisunnita da parte di questi ultimi
***
E’ salita ultimamente la tensione tra sciiti e sunniti nei paesi del Golfo, sullo sfondo delle dichiarazioni di un religioso sciita kuwaitiano che ha rivolto calunnie ed ingiurie alla madre dei credenti, Aisha (figlia del primo califfo, Abu Bakr, e terza moglie del Profeta Maometto (N.d.T.) ). A queste dichiarazioni è seguita la decisione del consiglio dei ministri kuwaitiano di privarlo della sua nazionalità.
A ciò si aggiunge l’aumento di tensione nel regno del Bahrein, dove si è arrivati a revocare la nazionalità del regno al rappresentante dell’Ayatollah al-Sistani. Tale decisione era stata a sua volta preceduta da richieste sciite di secessione provenienti dal regno saudita.
Tutto questo all’ombra dell’escalation occidentale con l’Iran, e delle accuse rivolte agli sciiti del Golfo di essere una potenziale quinta colonna dell’Iran, nell’ipotesi in cui dovesse divampare un conflitto nella regione a causa del programma nucleare iraniano – come ritengono gli osservatori.
Lunedì scorso, il consiglio dei ministri kuwaitiano ha ritirato la nazionalità al religioso sciita dissidente Yasser al-Habib, e l’agenzia d’informazione kuwaitiana “Kuna” ha riferito la notizia che nella sua riunione settimanale il consiglio dei ministri aveva approvato un disegno di legge per privare della nazionalità al-Habib, con l’accusa di “ingiuria ai simboli della religione, tentativo di diffondere il conflitto e la discordia nella società kuwaitiana, e incitamento al fanatismo settario”.
Il ministro incaricato degli affari del consiglio dei ministri, Roudan Abdulaziz Roudan, ha dichiarato che, alla luce degli orientamenti del Consiglio in merito alla questione riguardante fino a che punto al-Habib meritasse l’onore della nazionalità kuwaitiana, in base alla legge del 1959 su questa materia, e in conformità a ciò che richiedono gli interessi del paese, il Consiglio ha approvato un disegno di legge per revocare la nazionalità kuwaitiana ad al-Habib.
Egli ha inoltre indicato che sono state emesse “numerose sentenze giuridiche contro al-Habib, comprendenti l’ingiuria ai simboli della religione, la lesione dell’interesse nazionale e dell’ordine sociale del paese, e la diffusione dell’odio e dello spirito di discordia tre le componenti della società”. Egli ha anche attirato l’attenzione relativamente ai provvedimenti presi “riguardo alla comunicazione a livello arabo ed internazionale delle sentenze appena ricordate, in base alla richiesta della procura generale; al coinvolgimento dell’Interpol a questo proposito; ed al divieto a rinnovare il passaporto di al-Habib”.
Il consiglio dei ministri kuwaitiano ha incaricato le autorità competenti di adottare le misure necessarie per perseguire giuridicamente al-Habib, affinché renda conto delle sue azioni.
Yasser al-Habib aveva rilasciato dichiarazioni infamanti sulla figura di Aisha, moglie del profeta Maometto, e organizzato una festa, durante il mese di Ramadan, per celebrare la morte della madre dei credenti, Aisha figlia di Abu Bakr. L’aveva inoltre descritta come nemica di Dio e del Profeta accusandola di essere responsabile della morte dell’inviato di Dio, e di essere sottoposta al tormento del fuoco ed a mangiare carogne, essendo appesa per le gambe e mangiando la carne del suo stesso corpo.
Nel Bahrein, le autorità hanno annunciato domenica scorsa di aver revocato la nazionalità a un importante religioso sciita, lo Sheikh Hussein al-Najati, a sua moglie ed ai suoi tre figli. Questo provvedimento è giunto poche ore dopo la proibizione da parte delle autorità di Manama, rivolta nei confronti di un altro religioso sciita, lo Sheikh Abdul Jalil al-Miqdad, di pronunciare il sermone del venerdì per due settimane.
La Direzione Generale per la Migrazione e i Passaporti ha dichiarato che la decisione di revocare la nazionalità ad al-Najati e alla sua famiglia è stata presa dopo un controllo di routine. Il sottosegretario del ministero dell’interno per le questioni legate alla nazionalità, ai passaporti e alla residenza, lo Sheikh Rashid bin Khalifa Al Khalifa, ha affermato in un comunicato che il controllo aveva mostrato che al-Najati e la sua famiglia avevano ottenuto il passaporto del Bahrein “in maniera non conforme alle norme che regolano la nazionalità e i passaporti”.
Nel frattempo, l’Autorità del Bahrein per l’Informazione aveva annunciato lunedì il ritiro delle autorizzazioni concesse alle pubblicazioni di numerose associazioni politiche, accusate di aver trasgredito la legge vigente in materia. Due note associazioni di opposizione hanno confermato che la decisione colpiva anche le loro pubblicazioni ed hanno invitato l’Autorità per l’Informazione a ritirare il provvedimento.
Non è stato specificato quali siano le associazioni interessate dalla decisione, tuttavia l’Associazione Islamica della Concordia Nazionale – una delle principali correnti sciite del paese – e l’Associazione dell’Azione Nazionale Democratica, hanno dichiarato di aver ricevuto dall’Autorità per l’Informazione l’ingiunzione di fermare le loro pubblicazioni, ed hanno affermato di considerare questa decisione “squisitamente politica”, e di ritenere che essa rappresenti un regresso nel campo della libertà d’espressione.
In precedenza il dotto sciita saudita, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, aveva esortato la regione petrolifera orientale dell’Arabia Saudita – nella quale vivono la maggior parte degli sciiti sauditi – a separarsi dalle rimanenti parti del regno “per proteggere l’onore e la libertà dei suoi abitanti, e mettere fine alle discriminazioni settarie”.
Le dichiarazioni dello Shaykh al-Nimr erano coincise con quelle di alcuni oppositori sciiti residenti all’estero, ed erano state precedute dall’appello lanciato da un alto responsabile iraniano a considerare il Bahrein come la quattordicesima provincia dell’Iran. Quest’appello iraniano aveva suscitato irritazione in numerosi paesi arabi.
Alcuni osservatori ritengono che queste tensioni registratesi nella regione del Golfo rientrino nell’ambito dell’escalation occidentale contro l’Iran, alla luce delle notizie occidentali che parlano di un tentativo iraniano di entrare in possesso di armi atomiche.
Ahmad el-Masri
sabato 25 settembre 2010
Inondazioni? Il Fondo Monetario Internazionale non fa sconti al Pakistan
Exploitant sans honte le désastre humanitaire causé par six semaines d’inondations, le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) refuse d’accorder au Pakistan des fonds promis en 2008 dans le cadre d’un prêt tant qu’Islamabad n’aura pas appliqué des changements de politiques considérables – changements qui réduiront encore plus les revenus des travailleurs appauvris du pays.
Au début de l’été, le Pakistan était censé recevoir une tranche de 1,3 milliard de dollars faisant partie d’un prêt total de 11,3 milliards. Mais le FMI en a reculé la date du transfert après qu’Islamabad ne fut pas parvenu à atteindre divers objectifs de performances fixés par le FMI.
Après cela, plus de 20 millions de personnes et 79 des 124 districts administratifs du Pakistan ont été touchés par les inondations de la vallée de l’Indus.
Le bilan actuel donné par le gouvernement de 1700 morts est faible comparé au tsunami de 2004 dans l’océan Indien ou au tremblement de terre de janvier dernier à Haïti. Mais des millions de gens affamés et sans abri restent à la merci des maladies et, par bien d’autres aspects, cette catastrophe pakistanaise dépasse de loin ces tragédies.
En début de semaine, Maurizio Giuliano du Bureau des Nations unies pour la coordination des affaires humanitaires a qualifié les inondations d’« une des pires catastrophes humanitaires de l’histoire des Nations unies, en termes de nombre de personnes auxquelles il faut porter assistance et aussi de région concernée ».
Selon Giuliano, au moins dix millions de personnes sont actuellement sans abri. Une grande partie de l’infrastructure physique du pays, dont environ 1000 ponts et 4000 kms d’autoroutes, a été détruite et 23 pour cent au moins des récoltes de fin d’été et début d’automne du pays ont été détruites.
Les eaux ne s’étant pas encore totalement retiré, en particulier dans le sud du Sind, et les pertes des foyers et des entreprises commençant tout juste à être comptées, les estimations des dégâts ne sont que des approximations. Cependant, ces estimations gouvernementales, se montant à 43 milliards de dollars, représentent déjà près d’un quart du PIB annuel du Pakistan.
De plus, les inondations auront un effet durable sur l’économie du Pakistan, notamment sur la disponibilité et le prix de la nourriture et du coton, lesquels sont vitaux pour l’industrie textile pakistanaise, qui constitue sa plus importante source de revenus à l’exportation. Et cela se produit dans une situation où, même avant les inondations, un Pakistanais sur quatre, soit 45 millions de personnes, souffrait de malnutrition.
La semaine dernière, l’agence de notation Moody’s Investor Service a changé son avis sur les cinq plus grandes banques du Pakistan, de stable à négatif, en raison des inquiétudes sur le fait qu’elles pourraient être fragilisées par des prêts peu performants. Nondas Nicolaides, un responsable des analyses à Moody’s, a déclaré au Financial Times britannique que « Ce seront surtout les secteurs agricoles et textiles [qui seront touchés par les inondations], mais nous nous attendons à ce qu’un effet indirect se développe sur le système bancaire. »
Dans une crise sociale et économique aussi grave, les responsables pakistanais espéraient que le FMI pourrait être persuadé d’assouplir ses critères pour accorder la sixième tranche du prêt conclu en 2008. Mais lorsqu’ils ont rencontré les dirigeants du FMI à Washington dix jours durant à la fin août et au début de ce mois, ils ont été sèchement éconduits.
Selon un article publié le 8 septembre dans Dawn, les autorités du FMI ont adopté « une position très ferme » durant les négociations, affirmant « Que le conseil de direction du FMI n’a pas l’intention d’étudier la demande de fonds supplémentaires du Pakistan tant que celui-ci n’aura pas fait des progrès tangibles » quant à l’application des restructurations économiques dictées par le FMI.
Les négociations se sont terminées avec le directeur général du FMI, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, déclarant cela publiquement dans des termes pratiquement aussi directs.
Strauss-Kahn a indiqué que la délégation pakistanaise, dirigée par le ministre des Finances Abdul Hafeez Shaikh, a promis d’appliquer les diktats du FMI – y compris la suppression des subventions sur le prix de l’énergie et l’imposition d’une taxe générale sur les ventes. Mais il a déclaré que le FMI n’accorderait pas un centime des 2,6 milliards de dollars restant à verser sur le prêt de 11,3 accordé en 2008 tant qu’Islamabad n’aura pas effectivement réalisé sa promesse d’appliquer les réformes exigées.
Le directeur général du FMI a déclaré que la performance du gouvernement du Pakistan serait évaluée à nouveau à la fin de l’année pour déterminer si les réformes avaient été menées à bien et que seulement dans ce cas une nouvelle tranche serait transférée à Islamabad.
« Notre dialogue avec le Pakistan sur l’actuel arrangement en attente avance », a déclaré Strauss-Kahn, « et les autorités ont exprimé leur intention d’appliquer des mesures pour terminer la cinquième révision du programme dans le courant de l’année. »
« Nous resterons en contact étroit durant l’avancée de ces efforts. La réalisation de la cinquième révision [des objectifs fixés par le FMI] nous permettra de débourser 1,7 milliard supplémentaire. »
Le directeur général du FMI a dit qu’il recommanderait au conseil de direction du FMI de prêter au Pakistan 450 millions de dollars issus du Programme d’assistance d’urgence en cas de catastrophe naturelle pour aider Islamabad à porter secours aux victimes des inondations.
Mais avec une bonne partie du Pakistan en ruine – et avec près d’un tiers du budget du pays déjà consacré au remboursement des dettes – cela ne constitue qu’une maigre consolation.
La position de Strauss-Kahn a été soutenue par la Banque mondiale, qui tout comme le FMI est une organisation sous contrôle des États-Unis, dominée par les Occidentaux.
Dans une déclaration du 1er septembre, après avoir rencontré le ministre des Finances Shaikh, le président de la Banque mondiale Robert B. Zoellick a souligné le besoin pour Islamabad d’appliquer des réformes libérales avant tout. « Nous avons besoin, a dit Zoellick, de répondre fortement à cette crise, mais nous devons le faire sans perdre de vue les réformes économiques importantes. »
Il s’est ensuite lancé dans une menace contre le gouvernement pakistanais et la population du Pakistan, déclarant « La réponse des donateurs pour les inondations dépendra également de la capacité du gouvernement à faire ce qu’il a promis sur ce point. »
Les secours à apporter aux millions de victimes des inondations du Pakistan constituent ainsi pour les institutions financières impérialistes une arme qu’ils brandissent pour pousser à des réformes libérales qui faciliteront l’extraction du profit par les capitaux nationaux et, encore plus, internationaux.
Comparé à l’ampleur du désastre, le Pakistan n’a reçu qu’une aide au compte-gouttes de la part des gouvernements du monde. La banque mondiale, pour sa part, a accordé 1 milliard de dollars à Islamabad pour financer à la fois les aides immédiates et la reconstruction à long terme. Mais tout cet argent a été pris dans d’autres programmes existants de la Banque mondiale pour le Pakistan.
Les réformes exigées par le FMI et la Banque mondiale incluent :
— La transformation d’une taxe générale sur les ventes en une TVA à 15 pour cent. Cette nouvelle taxe transférant le fardeau des entreprises sur les travailleurs.
— L’élimination complète des subventions sur le prix de l’énergie. Jusqu’ici, le gouvernement s’était engagé à augmenter le prix de l’électricité d’au moins 25 pour cent en trois phases de 6 mois à partir du 1er octobre. (La Banque mondiale et la Banque pour le développement de l’Asie avaient estimé plus tôt dans l’année qu’une augmentation de 49 pour cent serait nécessaire pour réaliser la promesse du gouvernement de mettre fin à toutes les aides sur l’électricité.)
— L’autonomie totale de la banque centrale du pays et l’arrêt des prêts de la banque au gouvernement.
La coalition dirigée par le Parti du peuple pakistanais qui forme le gouvernement actuel du Pakistan a signé à plusieurs reprises des promesses au FMI sur cette politique de droite et sur d’autres comme des privatisations accrues. Elle l’a encore fait la semaine dernière.
Après la réunion à Washington, le ministre des Finances Shaikh a déclaré, « je veux réaffirmer l’engagement du gouvernement du Pakistan envers le programme de réforme économique, lequel inclurait une austérité fiscale ; une mobilisation des ressources domestiques ; une réforme des structures de gouvernance, y compris des entreprises du secteur public ; et un environnement favorable au secteur privé. Nous nous sommes engagés pour ce programme parce que c’est la voie à suivre pour garantir une reprise forte et se remettre sur la trajectoire de la croissance. »
Le gouvernement pakistanais se rend cependant compte qu’il est assis sur une poudrière sociale. C’est pourquoi il renâcle à mener des changements de politique économique dont l’effet immédiat serait d’alimenter l’inflation et de réduire la production. L’application de la TVA a été repoussée à plusieurs reprises et est actuellement prévue pour le 1er octobre, récemment le gouvernement a annulé l’augmentation des prix de l’électricité prévue pour le mois prochain.
Même avant les inondations de cet été, les journaux pakistanais regorgeaient de commentaires sur les troubles sociaux dus à la faim montante et à l’inégalité sociale ainsi qu’à la désaffection de la population pour un gouvernement civil qui a fondamentalement poursuivi la politique de la dictature militaire à la solde des États-Unis qui l’avait précédé. Cela inclut entre autres la collaboration de plus en plus rapprochée avec les États-Unis dans la guerre en Afghanistan et contre les milices pachtounes alliées aux talibans au nord-ouest du pays.
Ces inondations qui ravagent la vie de millions de Pakistanais ont aussi clairement mis en évidence l’incompétence, l’indifférence et la corruption du gouvernement et des élites dirigeantes dans leur ensemble, ce qui renforce encore plus les craintes de ces élites qu’il n’y ait un soulèvement social.
Mais, tout comme l’élite pakistanaise s’est montrée prête dans la poursuite de son alliance mercenaire avec l’impérialisme des États-Unis à plonger une grande part du pays dans la guerre civile, elle finira par se plier aux pressions du FMI et de la Banque mondiale et à appliquer des réformes économiques aux conséquences sociales incendiaires dans les mois qui viennent.
Le impressioni di un imam americano in Europa
Trouble in Europe
Issue 72 September 2010
I was on my way to northern Europe and decided to go by train. It amazes me every time I travel on the Eurostar how ingenious we humans are, by God’s grace. A 25 mile long tunnel beneath the seabed is not a small achievement.
In Brussels I had a meeting with a group of upcoming Muslim leaders to talk about how to train and develop the youth to face 21st century challenges. I have been running a Europe-wide training programme targeting 18-30 year old Muslims called “Learning to be a Peacemaker”. Belgium has a vibrant yet disconnected North African Muslim population, mainly running small shops and minding their own business. Their youth in large numbers are totally disengaged from the political process and far away from Islam. The conflict between culture and religion has repelled them from Islam. One of the young leaders said, “The biggest conflict is are they Moroccan Muslims living in Belgium or are they Belgian Muslims with Moroccan roots?” This is not a new debate for many of us, but those who are growing up and in their teens now are still being taught strange contradictions that only muddy further the already fractious identity debate. One of the leaders commented with utter resignation in her voice, “What is the point of all this? Unless problems in the Muslim world are solved, young Muslims in Europe will remain angry and may choose to disengage.”
I then travelled to Rotterdam. I had breakfast with a group of local elders, followed by a meeting with some young Dutch Muslims after the Friday prayers, but I wasn’t expecting to hear a Friday sermon in a mosque in the centre of the Hague in Malay! “For God sake, give the sermon in Dutch,” I said. My hosts were visibly embarrassed and didn’t know what to say. What is the point of a sermon if no one understands it?
The youth were eager to discuss politics with me. In the recent elections the Freedom Party of Geert Wilders had won many seats and was posed to become part of a coalition government. Wilders wanted to ban the Qur’an, send Muslims back to their countries of origin and those who stayed would be taxed extra if their women chose to wear the head scarf. “The irony is,” remarked one of the young Muslims who had converted to Islam, “Wilders proposes freedom for all except the Muslims.”
I then went to Dusseldorf, a German city that did not inspire me at all. My destination was a small town called Uppatal. My contact had arranged a meeting with the local mosque and a few other interested individuals. The man running the mosque was of Turkish origin and was under strict orders from the Turkish government not to involve himself with political activities, which suited me fine as I was proposing a training programme for the youth to become peacemakers. Nothing political about that.
I met a few Muslims from Ghana, Gambia and other African countries. Strangely, they did not show much interest in my proposal. Maybe they had come to Europe with other priorities. It was interesting to note that the Turkish Muslims were very comfortable with their lifestyle in Germany. They were able to inhabit both worlds: live and work in Germany; enjoy life in Turkey.
My next stop was Paris. Standing at the Gare du Nord train station I saw people of all shades and colours converge under one roof, yet no one took a moment to say hello to the next person. I had a meeting arranged with young French Muslims to discuss the Peacemaker programme, but they had something else in mind. They were still smarting from the burqa ban. The vast majority of French Muslim women do not wear any face covering, but they are in solidarity with women who do. For them it is a matter of principle. “And why should the state interfere! Does Sarkozy moan at topless pictures of his wife?” “Double standards,” exclaimed one of the Muslim youth. “The French State and many French people are simply racist,” another said.
On my way back to the railway station some of the young people accompanied me. As we were walking beside the Seine, I heard some shouting at the young women in our group. An older French woman had scoffed at them for wearing the hijab. “There is no room for you in our country; why don’t you go back to where you came from.” I ran after the woman and spoke to her in no uncertain terms. “Wake up and smell the coffee! We Muslims are here to stay. This is our home too. You may not want to accept that, but you should not be rude and racist.” She just walked off. I told the young Muslims they should never accept such intolerance and to always fight back. “But how can we fight a State, its media and its people?” asked a distraught young Muslim woman.
Words by Ajmal Masroor
venerdì 24 settembre 2010
Radio Marocco, radio francia
In Marocco la Francia finanzia Medi1
Marocco, settembre 2010 - Ex giornalisti a Medi1, Elodie Font e Marion Guénard raccontano i segreti di una radio controllata strettamente dal Potere, dove la minima gaffe in diretta può costare caro. E ricordano che il finanziamento di questo media assolutamente istituzionale è garantito in parte dalla Francia, attraverso una sovvenzione alla redazione francese
www.tamanrasset.net – 21 settembre 2010Testimonianza: In Marocco la Francia finanzia Medi1, una voce invecchiata del Re
di Elodie Font e Marion Guénard , ex-giornalisti a Medi1
Ex giornalisti a Medi1, Elodie Font e Marion Guénard raccontano i segreti di una radio controllata strettamente dal Potere, dove la minima gaffe in diretta può costare caro. E ricordano che il finanziamento di questo media assolutamente istituzionale è garantito in parte dalla Francia, attraverso una sovvenzione alla redazione francese(Da Tangeri). All’ultimo piano di una villa che domina il mitico stretto di Gibilterra, nel Nord del Marocco, comincia la giornata di giornalisti, animatori e tecnici. “Sette e mezza su Medi1 !” Come ogni mattina, da trent’anni, parte la sigla. E comincia un quarto d’ora di informazioni maghrebine e internazionali.
Radio Méditerranée Internationale, più conosciuta col nome di Medi1, ha spento da qualche giorno le trenta candeline. Dal 1980 trasmette 24 ore su 24, in arabo e in francese. Secondo i dati forniti dalla stessa emittente (non esiste un istituto di statistica), sarebbe ascoltata da più di 20 milioni di ascoltatori.
Da tre decenni, quando esisteva solo una informazione di regime, Medi1 è stata un UFO nel paesaggio mediatico maghrebino. Gli ascoltatori possono sentire il mattinale, dal tono più diretto e informazioni affidabili sull’attualità internazionale. Una stazione innovativa, che sembra indipendente.
Nonostante sia stata fondata da Hassan II: il Re cerca di contrastare la copertura algerina del conflitto in Sahara. L’idea seduce il presidente francese, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, che vi vede un mezzo per rendere permanente l’influenza francese in Maghreb.Medi 1 è un vento di libertà presto spento
L’accordo è concluso: Medi 1 sarà per il 51% di proprietà del Marocco e per il 49% della Francia, con l’intermediazione della Compagnia internazionale radio-televisiva (il CIRT), che abbiamo interpellato che ottenere delle informazioni, ma nessuno ha voluto risponderci.
Un vento di libertà che si spegne rapidamente. Medi 1 non sfugge alla regola: impossibile per la radio superare certi limiti. Principale parola d’ordine: mai offendere il potere reale, sia sotto Hassan II che sotto Mohammed VI.
Quando sale al trono, nel 1999, il re, di soli trent’anni, sembra propendere per l’apertura. E però mai come oggi Medi 1 è stata tanto controllata dal Palazzo. D’altronde è la radio che più di ogni altra riprende le attività reali – più ancora della Radio Televisione Marocchina, la fedelissima. Per attività reale si intende il racconto dettagliato della giornata del Re, qualsiasi cosa faccia.
Ecco l’estratto di un comunicato (preso a caso), pubblicato dalla MAP, l’agenzia di stampa ufficiale del Regno:
“SM il Re inaugura a Agadir un centro di formazione professionale misto e un centro di perfezionamento per donne, del costo totale di 12 milioni di dirham.
Agadir – Sua Maestà il Re Mohammed VI, che Dio L’assista, ha inaugurato, martedì a Agadir, un centro di formazione professionale misto e un centro di perfezionamento per donne, realizzato dalla Fondazione Mohammed VI per la solidarietà, per un costo globale di 12 milioni di dirham (1 milione di euro)”.
Nella radio, i giornalisti hanno il diritto di tralasciare il “Sua Maestà” e il “che Dio L’assista”. Per il resto, dicono le stesse cose. Tanto peggio se la notizia può sembrare incomprensibile. La cosa più importante è di risputare il dispaccio il più rapidamente possibile per radio. E di farne la prima pagina.
Spiegazione del nuovo amministratore delegato della radio, Hassan Khyar:
“Quando il Re, dopo avere inaugurato un centro, risale in macchina, vuole ascoltarlo su Medi1 il più presto possibile”.
Non ci si può sbagliare: Medi 1 è la voce del Re
E a ben ragione: con 20 milioni di ascoltatori, una diffusione in tutto il Maghreb, Medi 1 è diventata progressivamente la voce del re. In Marocco, ovviamente, ma anche per gli osservatori esteri. E non è ammesso alcun errore.
In maggio, uno di noi due ne ha pagato il prezzo. Il re dell’Arabia Saudita aveva fatto un dono al Marocco, e bisognava immediatamente trasmettere la notizia. Nella precipitazione ha parlato del “presidente dell’Arabia Saudita”.
In una monarchia, si tratta di un errore che non bisogna fare. Appena terminata la trasmissione, ha suonato il telefono nell’ufficio del redattore capo. Diverse decine di volte. Dall’altro capo del filo, arrabbiatissimi, l’Ambasciata dell’Arabia Saudita e il Palazzo reale.
In un’ora la radio è messa sottosopra. Nessuno capisce realmente che cosa sta per succedere. Né lei né i colleghi
Un’ora dopo la giornalista presenta un nuovo aggiornamento. All’uscita dallo studio, l’aspetta il redattore capo. Il viso grave, le annuncia: “Chiedono la tua testa”. Un’esigenza del Palazzo. Per questo errore è stata sospesa per tre giorni.Medi 1 parla più liberamente dell’Algeria, ma non fa molta inchiesta
Per evitare errori, tutti gli argomenti di politica interna e di società vengono evitati. Salvo che per qualche argomento caro alla famiglia reale (come la lotta contro il cancro), Medi 1 non è autorizzata a parlare del Marocco.
Dell’Algeria parla più liberamente. Negli anni 1990, il GIA algerino riusciva a far passare i suoi comunicati – coma la vicenda dei monaci di Tibeirine. I numerosi ascoltatori algerini cercano nella radio marocchina una immagine più critica del loro paese.
Su certi argomenti sono serviti. La questione del Sahara, per esempio – quello che in Francia chiamano il Sahara occidentale. Medi 1, come le altre stazioni marocchine, non può permettersi alcuna sfumatura: il Marocco ha sempre ragione, l’Algeria torto.
Medi 1 è molto ascoltata in Algeria e nonostante questo la stazione ha solo due corrispondenti fissi a Algeri. Allora, per parlare del paese, ogni mattina, la prima cosa che fanno i giornalisti è di spulciare la stampa algerina (El Watan, Liberté, L’Expression), e ricavarne un po’ di informazioni datate spesso uno o due giorni prima, e trasmetterle. Senza mai verificarle.
Affidarsi alla stampa algerina è una tradizione antica della redazione. Prova tra l’altro della scarsa evoluzione nel trattamento delle notizie. Dopo trenta anni, i giornalisti sono ancora costretti a passare per in centralino per telefonare all’estero: non ci sono mai invitati in diretta – per evitare ciò che è successo alla stazione privata Radio Mars; nessun reportage.Le sovvenzioni francesi alla radio aumentate nel 2010
Tuttavia Medi1 non ha problemi di finanziamenti. Fatto raro in tempi come questi di vacche magre, le sovvenzioni francesi sono addirittura aumentate quest’anno. Nel 2010, lo Stato ha versato alla radio 1,6 milioni di euro, per finanziare la redazione francofona – composta da una quindicina di giornalisti.
Anche se continua a essere un punto di riferimento, la vecchia Medi1 fatica ormai a competere con le radio concorrenti assai più spregiudicate (2M o Aswat).
Per rilanciarla, la nuova direzione sta per lanciare in ottobre un nuovo palinsesto. Uno dei principali obiettivi: sviluppare il digitale. Nonostante il “journalisme citoyen” sia apparso da diversi anni, il sito non propone alcuna forma di interattività con gli ascoltatori.
Medi1 è stato al suo apparire un soffio d’aria nuovo senza precedenti, un vero laboratorio di idee. Oggi è diventata una radio assai difficile da rinnovare.
Niente armi all'Iran
Collaborazione USA-RUSSIA… contro l’Iran
September 24th, 2010 by editor
di Andrea Gilli
Lo ho scritto dall’inizio dell’era Obama: gli Stati Uniti avrebbero cercato maggiore cooperazione con la Russia in campio di un atteggiamento più intransigente di Mosca sull’Iran.
Un primo risultato in questa direzione sembra essere stato raggiunto.
In breve, la Russia non venderà le sue batterie anti-missile S-300 all’Iran.
Questi sistemi terra-aria sarebbero gli unici in grado di bloccare, o quanto meno, depotenziare un eventuale attacco aereo contro i siti nucleari iraiani.
L’Iran non ha mai nasconto il suo interesse a comprarli. La Russia, dal canto suo, ha sempre nicchiato, foraggiando tanto l’interesse iraniano che l’apprensione americana.
E’ arrivata ora la decisione russa, che mette fine alla discussione. L’Iran si trova più isolato. Gli USA portano a casa una vittoria. Rimane da capire se l’Iran cambierà la sua strategia e cosa la Russia ci abbia guadagnato.
Armi ai sauditi
Balance of power in Medio-Oriente
Mi accingevo a preparare un breve post sui nuovi accordi per la vendita di sistemi d'arma dagli Stati Uniti all'Arabia Saudita quando mi sono accorto che Andrea Gilli mi ha preceduto.
Riporto integralmente il suo commento in quanto evidenzia perfettamente l'impatto che tale mossa potrebbe avere sull'Europa, sia da un punto di vista geopolitico che da un punto di vista industriale. In particolare, in un'ottica di contenimento della potenza iraniana, non posso non condividere le perplessità di Stephen Walt."Contrastare l'egemonia iraniana
Facciamo brevemente il punto della situazione. Gli Stati Uniti hanno in parte lasciato l’Iraq. L’Iraq è e rimarrà un Paese nel caos. L’Iran sta ampliando i suoi orizzonti geopolitici, cosa che non piace né agli USA né ai Paesi arabi. Quale può essere il risultato di questo risiko? Molti sventolano da tempo la bandiera dell’attacco preventivo israeliano contro i siti nucleari iraniani. In realtà, stiamo assistendo ad altro.
Gli Stati Uniti stanno letteralmente sommergendo di armi il Medio Oriente. La ragione: interessi nazionali.
In altre parole, non potendo mantenere truppe stabili in Iraq, per controllare la minaccia iraniana gli Stati Uniti si sono lasciati andare ad una politica muscolosa di off-shore balancing.
Stanno in altri termini dando i mezzi ad altri Paesi per affrontare la minaccia di Teheran. Caccia, missili per difesa missilistica a medio e lungo raggio, apparecchiature C4ISR e molto di più sono stati negoziati di recente tra Stati Uniti da una parte e Arabia Saudita, Oman, UAE e Kuwait dall’altra. In questa maniera, l’equilibrio militare in Medio Oriente si sta drammaticamente spostando a sfavore dell’Iran – che già non dispone di dotazioni particolarmente moderne.
Vale la pena fare due considerazioni. In primo luogo, questa escalation suggerisce un intensificarsi della minaccia iraniana. E’ però difficile dire se ciò derivi da una crescita militare registrata a Teheran o, invece, dal risultato del mezzo-ritiro americano dall’Iraq.
In secondo luogo, va notato come questa mossa militare abbia pesanti implicazioni economiche e geopolitiche, specie per gli assenti: l’Europa. Gli USA hanno dimostrato, in una mossa, di essere i soli in grado di fornire sicurezza internazionale e, di conseguenza, equipaggiamenti moderni. L’Europa, nel caso migliore, può assolvere solo il secondo ruolo. Il lato devastante riguarda però le cadute industriali: l’export militare ha spesso effetti di lock-in che sbarrano l’ingresso ai rivali per lungo tempo. L’Arabia Saudita è stata a lungo uno dei migliori clienti dell’Europa. Con questo accordo, non solo l’Europa politica è stata scardinata, ma anche quella militare-industriale ha subito uno scacco.
C’è infine un’altra domanda: quale effetto scaturirà da questa politica? Non possiamo dirlo. Certo, dare solamente all’Arabia Saudita armi per 60 miliardi di dollari quando l’intero bilancio della difesa iraniano ammonta a 10 sembra quanto meno esagerata.P.S.: qui un imponente rapporto sul military balance in Medio Oriente."
Straripanti shebab
The violence and insecurity in Somalia—the failed state on the edge of East Africa that serves as a gateway to the Arabian Peninsula—spread beyond its borders through piracy, arms deals, human trafficking, and terrorism. The weak transitional government backed by an African Union peacekeeping force is unable to exert influence outside the capital and is at risk of being toppled by Islamist insurgents. And fears recently rose that Somalia’s instability could directly threaten U.S., European, and African security after al-Shabab, a militant group with links to al-Qaeda, claimed credit for the brazen terrorist attacks in Uganda during the World Cup.
In a Q&A, Ken Menkhaus, a Somalia expert and professor at Davidson College, and Christopher Boucek assess the danger of terrorism originating in Somalia, analyze Shabab’s links with the global al-Qaeda network, and detail how the United States should respond. Menkhaus and Boucek conclude that while Somalia is not a particularly attractive home for al-Qaeda’s main leaders, Shabab has demonstrated its ability to wage war outside the country and that Washington lacks good policy options to confront the threat.
Does Shabab have links to al-Qaeda and global terror networks? Are Somali terror groups attracting fighters from around the world, including the United States?
What are the root causes of Somalia’s failed state?
How does Somalia’s insecurity spread beyond its borders and destabilize East Africa?
Will terror groups gain a stronger foothold in the region?
What is the regional reach of terror groups operating in Somalia? Is Shabab a threat to African security?
Is Shabab a threat to U.S. and European security?
How does the threat coming out of Somalia compare to that emanating from other states of concern?
How is Somalia linked to the Arabian Peninsula and Middle East?
What should the United States do to contain the violence?
Who are the key terror groups operating in Somalia? What’s the history of Shabab?
Shabab is one of the most feared and powerful militant jihadist outfits in Africa and the only organization in Somalia designated by the United States as a terrorist group. There are other armed and radical Islamist groups, but they are not identified as terrorist groups—and Shabab is the only one of real consequence at the moment.
Shabab was formed as a Sharia court militia in Mogadishu in the 1990s and then served as the militant wing of the short-lived Islamic Courts Union, a powerful force in southern Somalia that briefly controlled the capital prior to the invasion of Ethiopian forces in December 2006. Shabab was a small but effective fighting force and its leaders included committed jihadists, some of whom had served with the Afghan mujahideen. Until the Ethiopian occupation, the group answered to Hassan Dahir Aweys, a major figure in the Islamic Courts Union.
By 2005, Shabab included 400 men and was probably the strongest single fighting force in Mogadishu. At the time, the devastated and impoverished capital was still divided into small fiefdoms of warlords, armed businessmen, and Islamists. Shabab was decisive in defeating the U.S.-backed coalition of militias when war broke out in 2006 and the Islamic Courts Union came into power in June. For the next six months, it controlled Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia.
During this time, Shabab was led by a military commander, Aden Hashi Ayro, who had been to Afghanistan and leaned more heavily toward an affiliation with al-Qaeda than his political mentor Aweys. Shaykh Aweys was more of an Islamist nationalist and had been largely uninterested in the global agenda of al-Qaeda.
When Ethiopia intervened in December 2006 and successfully ousted the Islamic Courts Union, the political leadership fled the country to Eritrea. Shabab melted into Somalia’s interior, but quickly regrouped. It became the leading insurgent group against the Ethiopian occupation. Shabab transformed itself from a militia taking direction from political leaders to operating on its own accord as the leading force in the armed liberation movement. And some of Shabab’s young and emerging leaders had a stronger interest than the old guard in pursuing a relationship with al-Qaeda.
The group became a more radical Islamist movement and enjoyed a great deal of support from the Somali population during this time, even from the many Somalis who were appalled by its hardline interpretations of Islam and its affiliations with groups like al-Qaeda. Shabab capitalized on its role as a leader of the insurgency against Ethiopian military occupation, a cause that most Somalis rallied behind.
While the Ethiopian military occupation was designed to rid Somalia of a growing Islamist threat, the risk actually grew exponentially. Shabab was able to successfully conflate its radical Islamism with Somali nationalism. By 2008, the group had regained control of much of southern Somalia—from the Kenya border through most neighborhoods of Mogadishu. It inflicted heavy losses on the Transitional Federal Government, the interim parliament that was originally formed with international support in 2004 that had rode in on the Ethiopians’ coattails.
But when Ethiopia withdrew in January 2009 after the two-year insurgency, Shabab lost the two things that it defined itself as being against—the Ethiopian occupation and leader of the Transitional Federal Government, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who was pressured to resign. Still, the new coalition in the transitional government was unable to take advantage and Shabab successfully recast itself as a resistance to the African Union peacekeeping force. The terrorist group painted the peacekeepers as armed infidels occupying Somalia and portrayed the transitional government as apostates and puppets of the West.
In 2009 and 2010, Shabab was able to consolidate control over most of Mogadishu and southern Somalia and was even able to extend its control into central Somalia. In the process, it deepened its affiliation with al-Qaeda.
Does Shabab have links to al-Qaeda and global terror networks? Are Somali terror groups attracting fighters from around the world, including the United States?
The links between al-Qaeda and Shabab are largely ideological. Al-Qaeda has sent foreign advisors and in some cases political leaders to Somalia to offer political guidance—only a few years ago Shabab was seen as all muscle and no brain. But while Shabab defines itself as a partner or an affiliate of al-Qaeda, it’s not an expansion of al-Qaeda into Africa as the group’s leaders in Pakistan are not directing Shabab from abroad.
Foreigners are coming from all over the Muslim world to join Shabab, but not in significant numbers. Estimates only range between several hundred and several thousand at the moment. Foreign fighters have never been decisive in the group, so it’s important not to exaggerate their significance on Shabab’s success or plans.
Still, foreigners are coming to Somalia to join the fight. Back in 2007 and 2008, Somalia was one of the few places where an al-Qaeda affiliated organization appeared to be having success. In Iraq the situation looked terrible for them, in Afghanistan the struggle didn’t seem particularly promising, but in Somalia there was greater hope on the militants’ side.
Shabab crafted an attractive message that the Christian infidels of Ethiopia, backed by the infidel United States, were oppressing Somalis. The images coming out of Somalia were horrific—700,000 Somalis were displaced by fighting in Mogadishu—so there was a sense of righteousness and anger from people sympathetic to Shabab that the group tapped into easily.
The long stalemate between Shabab and the transitional government—backed by the African Union peacekeeping force—and lack of progress, however, created a fair amount of frustration on the part of the foreigners, causing some to go back home.
Assessing the influence of foreigners also depends on who is included—there are non-Somali foreigners and the Somali diaspora. One million to 1.5 million Somalis live abroad, and some have returned to the country to play roles on both sides of the war. Some are in the transitional government and others have joined Shabab, including approximately 20 Somali-Americans who were known to have been recruited in 2007.
Untrained foreigners who don't know the area or language can only play a limited role, but Shabab is undoubtedly interested in the diaspora for fundraising and as potential suicide bombers. One of the most important services that al-Qaeda has provided for Shabab is support for its propaganda and media outreach. The internet materials that al-Qaeda puts together—often produced or captioned in Arabic or English—are largely designed to recruit Somalis living abroad to support the movement.
In September 2009, senior al-Qaeda operative Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan was killed in southern Somalia by U.S. forces. Nabhan, a Kenyan national, was wanted in connection with the embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998 and the 2002 Mombasa attacks. Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, a Comorian national wanted in connection with the 1998 and 2002 attacks, has also been targeted in Somalia. One such attack in June 2007 killed Yemeni national Mansur al-Bayhani, who fought in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Al- Bayhani fled Yemen after escaping in the infamous 2006 Sanaa prison break, where 22 other senior al-Qaeda operatives—connected to a range of plots and cases, including the USS Cole attack—also escaped.
What are the root causes of Somalia’s failed state?
When the government was overthrown in 1991, Somalia had all of the essential features of a failing state—high poverty rates, an authoritarian regime, deep fissures within society, and an extreme vulnerability to external shocks and natural disasters. But unlike many of the other failing states around the world, Somalia has suffered from complete state collapse—this is a different category of failure from countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. The real question is why Somalia has failed for twenty years.
Somalia has been on a path of continued state failure ever since the government collapsed. There were several disastrous events that occurred in the first year of the civil war and after the fall of Mohammed Siad Barre’s government that made it much more difficult to revive a central state. The level of ethnic cleansing by the clans in the first month polarized the country in ways that make it extremely difficult to undo. And the complete destruction of the capital pushed the country into a whole new category of crisis.
This all led to the rise of a war economy. Powerful political and economic interests are served by a perpetuation of chaos. Ironically, the Somali people are also extraordinarily adaptable—they’ve arguably adjusted too well and been able to provide enough local security, informal justice, and basic social services either through the private sector, clan, or nongovernmental organizations, reducing the incentive to build a new state.
External meddling has also been an important factor. Either through incompetence or ill intent, the international community has made it more difficult for Somalis to pull together a state. A key example is the proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea that is being played out in Somalia. This proxy war has perpetuated violence by arming both sides of the conflict instead of seeking opportunities for compromise.
How does Somalia’s insecurity spread beyond its borders and destabilize East Africa?
Somalia’s unending chaos has long spilled over the border into surrounding countries. Kenya has taken the brunt of it as hundreds of thousands of refugees have poured out of Somalia. This influx of Somalis has brought both benefits—in the form of millions of dollars of investment capital—and trouble—in the form of instability, small arms, and criminal gangs. There is now a large Somali community in the neighborhood of Eastleigh, Nairobi, which in some ways amounts to a state within a state.
The crisis in Somalia clearly poses a major security burden for Ethiopia. The country shares a long, lawless border with the failed state and Somalia has long claimed territory controlled by its neighbor. Yemen is also becoming an increasingly important site for refugees and the influx has been extremely burdensome on the Arab state. And thanks to the prominent role that its peacekeepers are playing in the African Union force, Uganda is a major player in Somalia. The recent terrorist strikes in Kampala are directly tied to Uganda’s involvement in Mogadishu.
The insecurity also spreads past Somalia’s coasts as piracy has garnered a great deal of international media attention. Concentrated around the northeast coast, mostly in Puntland and parts of central Somalia, piracy is an extremely lucrative new source of income. It has attracted financial backers from Somalia’s political and economic elite. While recent activity is not linked to Shabab, the group certainly gets a cut one way or another as money in Somalia is particularly fungible. The difficulty for international actors trying to tackle piracy is that some of the same people who are complicit in backing it are allies in the war on terror groups.
Will terror groups gain a stronger foothold in the region?
The East Africa cell of al-Qaeda has long had a foothold in the region. The network’s central leadership relocated to Khartoum from 1991 to 1996 when Sudan welcomed Osama bin Laden. During this time it established a cell in Kenya with the original intent of reaching out to groups in Somalia.
With attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi in 1998, al-Qaeda found Kenya to be a suitable base. The group later targeted an Israeli-owned hotel and plane in Mombasa. But al-Qaeda was frustrated in Somalia as its outreach to Somali groups did not go smoothly.
Shabab is now the new addition to the broader portfolio of al-Qaeda activities in the region. Until recently, Somalia had a relatively limited role in al-Qaeda’s playbook as it was primarily a place through which to move money, men, and materials into East Africa. And this doesn’t take true believers as money can easily buy movement through Somalia with no questions asked.
While there are fears that Somalia could serve as a more important location for al-Qaeda, the country is not a particularly attractive place for a safe haven. Al-Qaeda figures have been using Mogadishu and other areas controlled by Shabab as a hideout on and off for at least seven years, but only for a limited number of people. With the exception of the far North, Somalia does not have the inaccessible mountain ranges that are easy to hide in. Instead, Somalia is open and flat and there are no foreigners, so outsiders stick out like a sore thumb—it’s not easy to keep secrets.
Al-Qaeda’s past experience in Somalia was negative, so it’s not seen as an attractive option for a major training base or the relocation of a large number of al-Qaeda operatives. As a fallback, however, it’s useful. If al-Qaeda ended up in Somalia because it was pushed out of Pakistan, that would be a problem for the Horn of Africa but actually a positive sign for the war against al-Qaeda and its allies.
Most Somalis see al-Qaeda as indifferent to the interests of Somalia—its agenda is not their own. The propaganda doesn’t have much resonance inside Somalia and there is residual bitterness between Somalis and the Arab world that further compromises al-Qaeda’s messaging. But the country’s young population—nearly 45 percent of Somalis are under the age of 15—could be more open to al-Qaeda’s arguments in the future. Still, even if al-Qaeda wanted to relocate to the failed state in East Africa, it would face an uphill battle ideologically.
What is the regional reach of terror groups operating in Somalia? Is Shabab a threat to African security?
The regional reach of Shabab is clear—it can strike throughout East Africa. With the low capacity of its police and an easily penetrated border, Kenya is the most vulnerable to attack. Shabab can essentially enter and leave Kenya freely, opening the door to hit the country’s soft targets more or less at will.
We suspect that the reason Shabab has yet to wage a coordinated campaign in Kenya is because there are enormous Somali investments in the country. This is one of the explanations offered for why Shabab hasn’t taken its war beyond Somalia’s borders—it fears blowback from Somali communities. A major terrorist attack would damage Somali investments and the ability of Somalis to live abroad would be compromised.
It is also important to note that Shabab is now quite unpopular in Somalia. Since 2009, it has found it more difficult to rationalize its harsh control. The group’s draconian interpretations of Sharia law and al-Qaeda affiliation are out of step with the local population. Shabab doesn’t want the Somalis to completely turn against it.
The terrorist attack in Kampala could be an indication that Shabab has passed the point of no return. Now they’ve crossed the line, and the consequences will slowly become apparent. Shabab was counting on a response from the African Union, regional powers, and the West that would play into its hands and drive Somalis into their arms. This did not happen, But with more attacks, they run the risk that other players can drive a wedge between Shabab and Somalis.
Is Shabab a threat to U.S. and European security?
The principal threat for the United States and its allies are to its sites, investments, and people in the region. While the risk of a terrorist attack by a sleeper cell in the United States is something that law enforcement officials need to be alert for—Shabab members have attempted to infiltrate via Mexico—the danger would be extremely high for Shabab to carry out an attack in the West.
Shabab would run the risk that members of the sleeper cell could be caught and then start talking openly to U.S. law enforcement agencies or that any successful strike would cause blowback from Somali-Americans. A terrorist attack would focus an enormous amount of attention on the Somali community and Somalis may hesitate or find it more difficult to send remittances back to Somalia.
The entire economy in Somalia relies on the remittances sent by the diaspora—over $1 billion per year. Without this inflow, the country would sink even further. So, anything Shabab does to threaten the flow of remittances increases the chances that the Somali people will completely turn on them. This is one of the possible reasons why Shabab hasn’t attempted a major strike beyond the region so far.
How does the threat coming out of Somalia compare to that emanating from other states of concern?
Somalia is not as big a threat as Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Yemen. While Shabab has clearly demonstrated its ability to mount attacks beyond Somalia’s borders, U.S. security officials are more concerned with containing the threats emerging out of South Asia and Yemen. Still, Somalia is undoubtedly a state of concern and the problems could continue to rise.
The head of Britain's security service MI5, Jonathan Evans, recently argued that the threat is increasingly coming from Somalia and Yemen. "Somalia shows many of the characteristics that made Afghanistan so dangerous as a seedbed for terrorism in the period before the fall of the Taliban," Evans said. The United States and Europe, however, are hamstrung by a lack of good policy options to tackle the roots causes of the country’s insecurity and instability.
How is Somalia linked to the Arabian Peninsula and Middle East?
Somalia’s links to the Arabian Peninsula largely run through Yemen and there are fears that terrorists can penetrate Africa from there. Yemen is playing an increasingly important role in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. There are well-developed organized crime links between Yemen and Somalia, including human trafficking and smuggling of diesel and arms. Somalis, Ethiopians, and Eritreans are trafficked out of the Horn into Yemen, in some cases before they head further north into Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states.
Yemen is the only place in the world where Somalis receive automatic asylum status; according to some estimates there are close to 200,000 Somalis in the country. Following the increased attention that Yemen has received since the failed Christmas Day bombing, Yemeni authorities have stated that they intend to do more to curb the migration of Somalis and indicated that part of the Somali community in Yemen may be repatriated.
There has been talk of small groups using the undergoverned spaces in Yemen for training purposes, and Yemenis and other Arabs have gone to fight in Somalia. Still, there doesn’t appear to be a strong relationship between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen-based affiliate of al-Qaeda, and Shabab. There has been movement between the two groups and Shabab offered to send personnel to Yemen to support al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, but the offer was declined. At this point the ties are largely incidental, but there is a potential for the relationship to grow stronger.
What should the United States do to contain the violence?
The U.S. government currently supports the Transitional Federal Government and looks at the internationally backed process of reconciliation between Somali factions in an inclusive government as the best way to find a long-term solution. But Washington has been mired in a year-long policy review process on Somalia and it has been stymied for the same reasons that everyone else has been—there are no good policy options.
The transitional government is exceptionally weak, venal, and corrupt. Somali leaders approach U.S. problems and concerns as their opportunities for personal gain. From the failed state to the humanitarian crisis to terrorism to piracy, Somali officials express interest in joining the programs designed to combat the problems, but have little interest in actually solving them—they are just after the money. With this in mind, Washington is trying to broaden its contacts and partners in Somalia—not to decertify the transitional government but to include additional sources of authority.
There are two sides to developing a strategy on Somalia—the United States can work to strengthen the transitional government and try to weaken Shabab. Washington has devoted most of its attention and energy on constraining and degrading Shabab, because the opportunities for working with the government are extremely limited. And this emphasis on containing Shabab is the best option available.
Financial pressure has played a key part in trying to squeeze Shabab, but this has also increased the pressure on aid agencies trying to operate in Somalia. Organizations are not delivering food aid in areas where they cannot guarantee that Shabab will not benefit and this continues to be an extremely controversial issue in the U.S. government. At the moment, however, development aid can’t play a major role in solving Somalia’s ills. The situation on the ground does not allow for effective humanitarian assistance or development projects with many items in danger of being stolen.
The prevailing wisdom is that Shabab is only strong because there is no viable alternative. Shabab is ridden with internal divisions and susceptible to fragmentation, but no one is in the position to challenge it. While many Somalis would like to see Shabab marginalized, few are willing to step into the line of fire. Shabab is particularly well skilled at intimidation and assassinations.
The United States has made it clear that it has no interest in allowing Shabab to Americanize the conflict. This is not a war between the United States and Shabab; it’s an internal struggle. Shabab is trying to play it as a global conflict. They win if it’s framed as a conflict pitting Somalis against foreigners, but lose if it’s seen as an internal struggle over the future of the country.
giovedì 23 settembre 2010
Sciiti del golfo
Crescono le tensioni con gli sciiti nelle monarchie del Golfo
Cresce la diffidenza delle monarchie del Golfo verso le proprie minoranze sciite: lo scrive il quotidiano libanese L'Orient-Le Jour, collegando queste tensioni alle minacce di Teheran di colpire i Paesi vicini in risposta ad uno scontro con gli Usa. I Paesi del Golfo, spiega il quotidiano, diffidano delle minoranze sciite, temendo che possano agire da 'quinta colonna' dell'Iran. Per citare alcuni esempi, ci si riferisce ad esempio al Bahrein, dove le autorità hanno arrestato all'inizio di settembere 23 oppositori sciiti, accusandoli di fomentare un complotto contro la monarchia, alla vigilia delle elezioni di ottobre. I sospetti avrebbero tenuto riunioni segrete con il fine di "cambiare il regime con mezzi illegali". Altre fonti ricordano che in agosto sono stati 250 gli arrestati per disturbo dell'ordine pubblico. L'Orient-Le Jour riferisce anche dei timori dei Paesi del Golfo che membri delle comunità sciite siano stati addestrati a compiere atti di sabotaggio in caso di attacchi all'Iran e ricorda che in agosto la stampa kuwaitiana aveva denunciato l'esistenza di 'cellule terroriste dormienti', pronte a colpire in Kuwait, Barhein e Arabia Saudita . Lunedì scorso le autorità del Barhein hanno privato della nazionalità un alto dignitario sciita di origine iraniana, l'ayatollah Hussein Mirza Najati, rappresentante, in questo Paese, della massima autorità sciita irachena, l'ayatollah Sistani. Parallelamente, un'ondata di arresti ha colpito gli attivisti della comunità sciita, che in Barhein è maggioritaria, malgrado il Paese sia governato da una monarchia sunnita. Nel Kuwait, dove gli sciiti rappresentano un terzo della popolazione, negli stessi giorni è stato privato della nazionalità un altro attivista di questa comunità, Yasser al-Habib, accusato di 'sedizione confessionale': in precedenza, peraltro, erano stati vietati assembramenti, per contenere le tensioni provocate da dichiarazioni dello stesso al-Habib
il tuo parere
La gioventù americana va in Somalia
The Department of Justice last Thursday unsealed indictments charging 14 individuals – mostly American citizens – of allegedly supporting, or attempting to support, the al Qaeda-linked Somali terrorist group al Shabaab. Only two of the 14 individuals named are currently in U.S. custody – the rest are believed to be in Somalia.
The unsealing of the indictments came two days after the FBI arrested Shaker Masri, a 26-year-old Chicagoan born in Alabama, who was planning to travel to Somalia to execute a suicide attack targeting “infidels.” Less than a month ago, U.S. federal authorities also arrested northern Virginia resident Zachary Adam Chesser after he attempted to travel to Somalia, allegedly to join al Shabaab. This string of arrests reveals the alarming success al Shabaab has achieved in recruiting aspiring Western militants and reflects the challenge the counterterrorism community faces in combating this threat.
At least two dozen Americans have traveled or attempted to travel to Somalia in support of al Shabaab since late 2007, shortly after the group began operating as an autonomous entity. Al Shabaab recognized the value of foreign – and especially Western – fighters early on: As one top al Shabaab official said in 2008, “We seek to empower the shari’a of Allah and commit His faith to His worshippers, in perfect conformity between the global jihad and the jihad in Somalia. However, [we] lack the precious element of the foreign fighters. There are an insufficient number of non-Somali brothers.” The group has since put forth a robust effort to fill that void and reach out to Westerners. It has released numerous English-language recruiting videos and statements, and, in 2010, nearly all of the group’s significant videos have been in English or at least included English subtitles. Notably, one of the group’s early statements taking credit for the July 11 Uganda bombings appeared in a well-written English communiqué.
Al Shabaab also regularly features an Alabama-born commander in its ranks named Abu Mansour al Amriki, whose given name is Omar Hammami. Al Amriki has not only served as an English-speaking recruiter for al Shabaab, but as a high-ranking commander. He serves as a model – proving to aspiring American militants that they, too, can achieve positions of prominence in the group. Prosecutors unsealed a September 2009 indictment on Thursday that charges al Amriki with providing material support to al Shabaab.
The most recently unsealed indictments are a further indication that al Shabaab has an intricate grassroots recruiting network in the United States and Europe, which Attorney General Eric Holder described as a “deadly pipeline that has routed funding and fighters” to Somalia. In addition to those who have left to fight in Somalia, al Shabaab has recruited individuals to raise funds to support the group. One of the unsealed indictments documented that two such individuals, Amina Farah Ali and Hawo Mohamed Hassan, provided funding to al Shabaab between September 17, 2008 and July 19, 2009. An estimated 2 to 3 million Somalis live outside their homeland, and approximately 150,000 to 200,000 live in the United States – most in Minneapolis, Seattle, Atlanta, Washington, and Columbus, Ohio. The majority of Somalis – both in and out of Somalia – adheres to the peaceful brand of Sufi Islam and detests al Shabaab and the radical form of Islam that it espouses. Al Shabaab, however, has successfully used surrogate recruiters and fundraisers, including imams, at mosques and community centers to prey on Somalis and silence the families of potential recruits.
The recent arrests of Americans seeking to join al Shabaab prove the success of the group’s recruiting efforts and the continued threat to national security posed by al Qaeda-affiliated movements abroad. The FBI has taken clear steps to combat al Shabaab’s outreach to the Somali community, especially in Minnesota. There is an ongoing, two-year long investigation into the recruitment of individuals from the U.S. to fight with al Shabaab. A total of 19 people, including those revealed on Thursday, are known to have been charged in Minnesota alone, nine of whom have been arrested and five of whom pled guilty.
Despite the concerted efforts of the FBI and other counterterrorism agencies, the ability of al Shabaab and other groups in the global jihad network to recruit individuals has increased significantly over the past few years. Al Shabaab is not the only international terrorist organization that has attempted to recruit Westerners into its ranks. Recently, Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s media arm, the al Malahem Foundation, released al Qaeda’s first official English-language publication, a lengthy magazine it called Inspire. The magazine encourages Westerners to carry out small-scale attacks, provides basic instruction on how to make a bomb, and offers instructions on how to join the group in Yemen.
The American-born Yemeni cleric Anwar al Awlaki wrote the feature article in that magazine. Both Chesser and Masri, the two individuals arrested for attempting to join al Shabaab, have mentioned Awlaki’s influence on their beliefs. Awlaki’s English-language messages have the ability to reach and inspire aspiring militants nestled into Western societies. Awlaki is the first known American citizen to have been placed on the CIA’s “capture or kill” list, and the U.S. Treasury Department and UN recently placed him on their respective terrorist lists for his leadership role in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Efforts by al Shabaab and other al Qaeda-affiliated organizations to attract Americans into their ranks only multiply the threat posed by such groups. Al Qaeda and its associated movements appear to have made the recruitment of Americans and Westerners a top priority in their overall strategy. American recruits increase the likelihood of a group’s ability to strike abroad because of the access that American passports allow to international targets. Further, American recruits can identify and provide insight on targets inside the U.S., as revealed by the Pakistani Taliban’s decision to let the Times Square Bomber – an American citizen – choose his own target. Finally, American recruits have the ability to enhance a group’s propaganda efforts and attract even more English-speakers. The counterterrorism community has demonstrated its ability this past month to track and apprehend aspiring American terrorists, but, unfortunately, the terrorist groups have ramped up their efforts to attract even more Western recruits.
Ziba, donne, islam
Interview with Ziba Mir-Hosseini"We Need to Rethink Old Dogmas"
Born in Iran and now based in London, Ziba Mir-Hosseini is one of the most well-known scholars of Islamic Feminism. In this interview with Yoginder Sikand she talks about the origins and prospects of Islamic feminism as an emancipatory project for Muslim women and as a new, contextually-relevant way of understanding Islam
"Feminism is a kind of path that can be followed by everyone – regardless of gender, sex, race, faith and other differences among us." Ziba Mir-Hosseini, social anthropologist and Islamic feminist In recent years, a number of Muslim women's groups have emerged across the world, struggling for gender equality and justice using Islamic arguments. Most of them are led by women who come from elitist or, at least middle class, backgrounds. Many of them seem to lack a strong popular base. How do you account for this?
Ziba Mir-Hosseini: I think the majority of the women who are writing and publishing about what is popularly called 'Islamic feminism' are definitely from the elite or the middle class. But then, globally speaking, feminism has always had to do with the middle class, at least in terms of its key articulators and leaders. I believe that Islamic feminism is, in a sense, the unwanted child of 'political Islam'. It was 'political Islam' that actually politicized the whole issue of gender and Muslim women's rights. The slogan "back to the shariah" so forcefully pressed by advocates of political Islam in practice meant seeking to return to the classical texts on fiqh, or Muslim jurisprudence, and doing away with various laws advantageous to women that had no sanction in the Islamists' literalist understanding of Islam.
It was this that led, as a reaction, to the emergence of Islamic feminism, critiquing the Islamists for conflating Islam and the shariah with undistilled patriarchy and for claiming that patriarchal rule was divinely mandated. These gender activists, using Islamic arguments to critique and challenge the Islamists, brought classical religious texts to public scrutiny and made them a subject of public debate and discussion, articulating alternative, gender-friendly understandings, indeed visions, of Islam. That marked the broadening, in terms of class, of the fledgling Islamic feminist movement.
Surely it isn't possible to bracket all Islamists together. There is a large diversity of opinion, including about women, even among Islamists. Some of them do at least sound less regressive than others on women's rights.
Mir-Hosseini: That's true, of course. But, for all Islamists the gender issue is of paramount significance. One of their main claims to legitimacy, which they all seem to share, is their critique of the West, a central plank of which is a moral vision that rests on strengthening the family. They don't say that women have no rights – after all, the language of political Islam is also one of rights. Rather, they claim that Islam gives women all the rights they need, though, what this actually means for women is, for all practical purposes, the same patriarchy.
The tension between Islamic feminists and patriarchal Islamists is as acute as that between the former and many fellow feminists, who believe that Islamic feminism is an oxymoron and that, in fact, it will only strengthen the Islamists in the long-run with its use of Islamic, instead of secular, human rights, arguments.
Mir-Hosseini: It certainly leaves them open to that oft-hurled charge, but then anyone who works for gender justice, even if she doesn't depend on foreign money, is quickly branded with the same label! So, what other option do they have? The fact of the matter is that many Muslim women live in undemocratic contexts that lack strong civil society institutions that can support the sort of work they are engaged in. This forces many NGOs working with Muslim women to fall back on Western funding agencies. After all, the oil-rich Saudi Wahhabis are certainly not going to fund NGOs working for justice and equality for Muslim women, even if these are articulated in an Islamic paradigm. But that said, those women's groups who, for lack of any other alternative, are forced to depend on Western funds, must be clear that they don't become their puppets.
With just a few notable exceptions, the key articulators of Islamic feminist discourse are all non-Arab Muslims. Does that strike you as strange, given the marked tendency among many Arabs – and many non-Arab Muslims as well – to see the Arab world as the "heartland" of Islam?
The focus of many key Islamic feminist NGOs is the reform of personal laws in Muslim contexts that militate against women's equality. Do you see this as a somewhat narrow focus? After all, personal law is not the only problem that many Muslim women face? For many of them, gruelling poverty, for instance, might be an even more pressing concern.
Mir-Hosseini: I think the issue of gender relations within the family – which is what personal laws are all about – actually relates to the core of power in society at a broader level. Since the family is the basic unit of society, only if there is justice and democracy within the family can you possibly have justice and democracy in the wider society. In other words, the key to democratizing the whole society is to democratize its basic unit, the family, and for this legal reform is crucial.
Mir-Hosseini: For me feminism is both a consciousness that women suffer discrimination at home, at work and in society and in life because of their gender, as well as action to do something about this. So it is a striving for justice and equality for women in a just world; it is a frame of mind and a way of life, a kind of path that can be followed by everyone – regardless of gender, sex, race, faith and other differences among us.
But justice and equality are contested and relative concepts, in the sense that they mean different things to different people in different contexts. There is also an epistemological side to feminism, it is also a knowledge project; in the sense that it tells us how we know what we know. Feminist scholarship in Islam as in any other religious tradition has a lot to offer to both the understanding of religion and the search for justice. But feminism, as an ideology, as a movement, as well as a knowledge project, in order to grow and not to become dogmatic, needs to have a critique from within.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Black and 'Third World' feminists provided that critique; for instance, Audre Lorde's criticism of mainstream feminist literature of the 1960s for its focus on the experiences of white, middle-class women and their values; Chandra Mohanty, with her seminal article "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse" offered a potent critique of the complicity of feminism and colonialism. Such criticism helped feminism to grow theoretically and become more inclusive.
What could secular feminists learn from Islamic feminists? Do you personally agree with the overall secular feminist critique of the notion of the complimentarity of the sex roles that underlies general Muslim understandings?
But then, feminist theory has now come to appreciate that the kind of equality that basically entails a purely legal or formal reversibility of roles does not bring women real equality. Women do not start from the same starting point in life as men, and they are not on a level playing field, so we need a new concept of equality that takes into account difference. The fact is that neither are all women exposed to discrimination nor do they experience it in the same way; race, class, education, ethnicity, being part of the 'third' or 'first' world – all these factors matter. Men are as oppressed as women in many situations, and are sometimes are dominated by them.
There has been a shift in feminist theory from formal models of equality to what is now called substantive equality – there is now a big debate going on, and Muslims need to take part in this debate. We need to rethink old dogmas, both religious and feminist, and this is where we can learn from each other.
Interview: Yoginger Sikand
© Qantara.de 2010
Ziba Mir-Hosseini is the author of numerous books on the subject, including Islam and Gender, the Religious Debate in Contemporary Islam (Princeton, 1999). She is presently associated with the Centre for Islamic and Middle Eastern Law at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London.
Editor: Lewis Gropp/Qantara.de
